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Abstract 
Despite significant advancements in the solving of com¬ 
puter security problems, it has been reported that over 90% 
of all computer installations have inadequate security. A 
contributing factor to this phenomenon has been the user’s 
inability to adequately determ.ine his security needs. To 
remedy this situation, it is essential to develop analytical 
tools to define security needs in differing user environments. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate 
four methods for defining computer security needs in a uni¬ 
versity data base environment. The methodology employed was 
that of an exploratory field study. 
In Chapter II, the literature was reviewed. The inter¬ 
relation of privacy issues and computer security problems was 
developed and security problems were classified. James 
« 
Martin's Security Exposure Rating and Rein Turn's Value of 
Information Measure were presented as possible alternatives 
for defining computer security needs. 
vi 
A contemporary view of data base design and the factors 
to be considered in developing a data base security model 
were presented in Chapter III. Data organization in a data 
base, key characteristics of data base design, and problems 
unique to data base design were presented as background to 
the problem. It was pointed out that the relationships of 
Turn's four design criteria (effectiveness, economy, simpli¬ 
city, and reliability) for an effective security plan are 
not clearly understood. Further, an objective function must 
be decided upon before such a plan can be developed. Con¬ 
straints suggested are the value of the information stored 
in the data base and the cost of the protection plan. 
Presented and analyzed in Chapter IV were the four 
methods for defining computer security needs as well as a 
major control problem uncovered in the course of the study. 
The student data base at the University of Massachusetts 
served as the test facility. 
First, major users of the new data base were interviewed. 
They were asked to determine the effect of accidental or in¬ 
tentional destruction, modification, or disclosure of data 
elements on the operation of their departme3its. In general, 
it was found that this was an inadequate method for defining 
security needs as few users were able, or even willing, to 
consider the consequences of various events occurring. 
Second, the actual structure of the data base was de- 
% 
Vll 
fined. It was suggested that by determining which users have 
authority to create, to access, or to update data elements 
that basic security needs would be uncovered. The informa¬ 
tion developed from this method is necessary for the crea¬ 
tion of authorization matrices but not sufficient for the de¬ 
velopment of a complete security plan. 
Third, the actual usage of data elements in the data 
base was determined. It was suggested that valuable informa¬ 
tion about the usage of the data base would be determined. 
This information could be used for defining backup procedures 
and access monitoring but, again, failed to provide sufficient 
information to develop a complete security plan. 
Finally, the actual usage of the computer system was in¬ 
vestigated. It was found that user departments vary in the 
manner in which they use the system and the time periods in 
which their heaviest usage occurs. This provided informa¬ 
tion about peak usage periods which is necessary for the de¬ 
velopment of an adequate security plan. 
While none of the four methods clearly defined security 
needs in a university data base environment, each one pro¬ 
vided information necessary in the creation of an adequate 
security plan. It was concluded that needed is a procedure 
for the logging of security breaches which would eventually 
be employed to develop occurrence probabilities. 
In Chapter V the limitations of the study were presented. 
Recommendations for further research were also suggested. 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank a number of people for their en¬ 
couragement and support during the preparation of this dis¬ 
sertation. Professor Van Court Hare, Jr. has served as both 
my doctoral program advisor and as chairman of my disserta¬ 
tion committee. Ke has always been most generous with his 
time and with his guidance. 
Professors John G. Burch, Jr. and Hugh J. Miser also 
generously contributed their comments and assistance in com¬ 
pleting this dissertation. Their help was also significant. 
To the people in Management Systems and the other people 
in various departments whom I interviewed I thank them for 
their assistance. Special thanks goes to Bard VThite, Robert 
Baron, and Martha Little for without the large blocks of 
time that they gave me this dissertation would have been im¬ 
possible. 
To Mrs. Vesta Powers I would like to extend my thanks. 
Her cheerfulness and competence in typing the final copy 
greatly helped me to com.plete the dissertation. 
Lastly, but not least, to my wife, Martha, I owe a 
great deal of thanks for typing, proofreading, and loving 
support during this difficult project. Because of her 
dedication to me, this dissertation is dedicated to Martha 
and a future "computer jock," Jennifer. 
Table of Contents 
t • * 
Vlll 
Page 
■ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . iv 
Abstract  v 
Table of Contents.viii 
List of Tables. xi 
List of Figures.xii 
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION . 1 
The Problem in Perspective . 1 
Purpose of the Study. 3 
Significance of the Study  3 
Structure of the Report. 4 
Footnotes  5 
CHAPTER II - COMPUTER SECURITY IN REVIEV7. 6 
Introduction . 6 
Definition of privacy . 6 
Definition of security  7 
Privacy and security relationship . 8 
Threats. 11 
Risk measurement. 12 
Research and statistical databanks . 20 
Countermeasures  23 
Physical security measures ...  24 
Authorization procedures ....  27 
Encipherment of data.  38 
Controls. 43 
Miscellaneous Topics  44 
Statistical models  44 
Comprehensive security plans . 47 
Extent of Concern. 49 
Computer abuse . . . ‘. 49 
Vendor concern  51 
User c ncern. 53 
Summary.  55 
Footnotes .. 57 
ix 
Page 
CHAPTER III - DEVELOPING A SECURITY PLAN FOR A 
DATA BASE ENVIRONMENT. 66 
A Contemporary View of Data Base Design. 66 
Data organization. 66 
Key characteristics. 67 
Probl ms. 69 
Developing a Data Base Security Model. 71 
Design criteria . 71 
Objective function  78 
Value of information. 80 
Costs of a security pl n. 83 
Summary. 86 
Footnotes. 87 
CHAPTER IV - DEFINING SECURITY NEEDS . 88 
Introduction . 88 
User environment. 88 
Computer environment  89 
Administrative computation . . . 90 
Preliminary Investigation  96 
University data bases. 96 
Information system structure  99 
Control philosophy  102 
Invisible intruders  105 
Four methods of analysis. 108 
The First Method: User Interviews . 110 
Interview Process . Ill 
Consequence estimates  112 
Peak usage periods. 115 
The Second Method: Data Base Structure. 118 
Data categories. 118 
Data element--creators . 121 
Data element—accessors. 123 
Data element updaters. 123 
The Third Method: Data Elemient Usage. 125 
Rank order usage. 127 
Most frequently used. 127 
The Fourth Method: System Usage . 131 
Monthly accesses . 131 
Percentage of monthly usage  135 
Percentage of annual usage  137 
Peak usage periods. 141 
User classifications. 142 
The Four Methods Reviewed. 145 
A fifth method proposed . 145 
Factors of a university security plan.149 
X 
Page 
CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS.151 
Summary.152 
Limitations of the Study.157 
Areas for Further Research.158 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . 161 
APPENDIX A.169 
APPENDIX B 176 
APPENDIX C. 183 
APPENDIX .190 
APPENDIX . 197 
APPENDIX F 200 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
2-1 Probability Ratings. 2.4 
2-2 Damage Ratings. ]_5 
4-1 User Departments Interviewed. 
4-2 Consequence Estimates . 214 
4-3 Perceived Peak Usage Periods . 216 
4-4 Data Categories. 219 
4-5 Processing Items  121 
4-6 Most Frequently Called For Data Names and 
Departments Calling Them . 130 
4-7 Teleprocessing Accesses Per Month by User 
Departments for 19 74  133 
4-8 User Departments Teleprocessing Accesses 
as a Percentage of Annual Use for 1974 . 136 
4-9 User Departments Teleprocessing Accesses as 
a Percentage of Total Monthly Use for 1974 . . . 138 
4-10 Monthly Accesses . 139 
4-11 User Accesses. 140 
4-12 Suggested User Classes. 143 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
2-1 Security and Privacy Relationships . 9 
2-2 Computer Network Vulnerabilities  13 
2-3 Risk Analysis and Evaluation of Protection 
Programs. 17 
2- 4 Graham's Rings of Protection . 36 
3- 1 Tradeoff Between Response Time and Reliability . . 75 
3-2 Tradeoff Between Probability of Detection 
and C s . 77 
3- 3 Effect of Increasing Expenditures on the Number 
of Illegal Attempts . 77 
4- 1 Computer Processing Employing Autonomous Files . . 91 
4-2 Computer Processing Employing Integrated Files . . 91 
4-3 Com.puter Processing of Student Records 
Employing a Data Base at the University of 
Massachusetts.  93 
4-4 University Data Bases . 9 8 
4-5 Components of the Data Base Information System . . 100 
4-6 Invisible Intruders . 107 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem In Perspective 
Since the early 1960's the concern about computer se¬ 
curity has grown rapidly. During this period of growth the 
computer's use has grown to a point where many organiza¬ 
tions are now dependent upon the computer's functions to 
carry on their work. To insure that the computer remains 
in operation it is important that security be given appro¬ 
priate consideration in the development of any information 
system. 
Security can be defined to apply to data security or 
computer security or some combination of both. Data secur¬ 
ity is defined by Turn and Shapiro as the protection pro¬ 
vided for the databank system against deliberate or acci¬ 
dental destruction, and unauthorized access or modification, 
of the data.^ Computer security may be defined as the pro¬ 
tection of the hardware from loss due to fire or some other 
unfortunate event, but information systems require that the 
computer system and the data that it stores be protected 
against threats from the environment. 
Over the course of the last decade a great amount of 
effort on the part of computer manufacturers, computer users, 
and independent researchers has been directed to developing 
secure computer systems. Early efforts were directed at 
2 
identifying potential threats to computer systems and an 
enumeration of possible countermeasures to prevent these 
2 
threats from occurring. From that base, a number of oper¬ 
ating systems were written which contain data security fea- 
3 
tures. Physical security considerations have become well 
4 . 5 
defined and checklists have been developed which aid the 
user in implementing various security measures. 
The design and implementation of a security plan v/ill 
remain more of an art than a science until adequate theo¬ 
retical foundations are laid and analytical tools developed 
g 
for a "data security engineering" discipline. Needed in 
particular are measures for evaluating the effectiveness of 
data security techniques in various threat situations, 
methods for estimation of the costs of implementing the 
safeguards in various classes of information, and explora¬ 
tion of tradeoff relationships between these and other rele¬ 
vant variables. Equally important is the abi]ity to esti- 
7 
mate potential losses. 
The security needs of each computer system and computer 
user vary based on the complexity of the computer system, 
the types of applications, and the value of the data stored 
and processed by the computer system. Therefore, a security 
plan must be individually tailored for the particular needs 
of the computer user. 
Recently, data bases have become more popular. Secur¬ 
ity needs for a data base differ from traditional data pro- 
3 
cessing techniques because of the availability of the on¬ 
line accessing capability, the storage structure of data, 
the dependence of one user's actions on another, and a 
host of other capabilities unique to data base design. Com¬ 
puter users, beginning to use data bases, may find that the 
security plan that was previously adequate will not be 
sufficient. Additional research is required to develop 
analytical tools for determining these additional security 
needs. 
Purpose of The Study 
The purpose of this study is to investigate four pos¬ 
sible alternatives for determining security needs in a 
data base environment. In particular, a university com¬ 
puter system will be employed for this field study. 
Significance of The Study 
Little is currently known about the effectiveness of 
various security plans. The reason for this is that secur¬ 
ity plans have not been developed to meet a defined set of 
needs, and no one has been able to establish procedures for 
determining these needs. 
As the determination of security needs should be the 
first step in the design and implementation of any security 
plan, this study should aid in eliminating the "seat of the 
pants" approach currently in use by, many data base users. 
I 
4 
By so doing, it will also help the creation of a more cost- 
effective security plan. 
Structure of The Report 
In addition to this chapter, the report contains four 
other chapters. Chapter II will present a discussion of 
the most relevant literature relating to security issues. 
Many of the important factors in all security plans will be 
presented in this chapter. 
Chapter III will present a discussion of the theoreti¬ 
cal considerations of defining a complete security plan. 
In Chapter IV the four suggested alternatives for defining 
security needs in the student data base at the University 
of Massachusetts will be presented. 
Finally, Chapter V will summarize the significance of 
this work and its basic limitations. Along with this ma¬ 
terial will be a general discussion of areas for further 
study. 
5 
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CHAPTER II 
COMPUTER SECURITY IN REVIEW 
Introduction 
Definition of privacy. The term privacy is often in¬ 
correctly used as a synonym for computer security. Much of 
the confusion stems from the 1967 Spring Joint Computer 
Conference when Willis Ware introduced a session on secur¬ 
ity and privacy by defining the terms security and classi¬ 
fied to refer to defense or military information or situa¬ 
tions while private and privacy were used in reference to 
corresponding industrial or non-military governmental situ¬ 
ations.^ Ware*s original framework is not now the current¬ 
ly accepted definition of either privacy or security. 
Early references to privacy in U.S. Iav7 appear in a 
decision by Justice Louis Brandeis. He defines i:)rivacy as 
2 
the "right to be left alone." Further, Brandeis indicates 
that this right is "the right most valued by civilized 
men." Most legal references to privacy since the early 
1900's have been based on the Brandeis decision. At about 
the same time that VJare was defining privacy, Alan Westin 
defined it as: 
"...the claim of individuals, groups, or institu¬ 
tions to determine for themselves when, how, and 
to what extent information about them is communi¬ 
cated to others."4 
However, Peter Browne defines privacy as the guarantee to 
7 
the proprietor of a file that information contained therein 
is not made available to unauthorized users. Perhaps, 
Rein Turn's definition of an individual's right to privacy-- 
his right to determine for himself what personal information 
6 
to share with others --is a good blending of Westin's and 
Browne's definitions. This is particularly true if we de¬ 
fine "share" as providing the information originally and 
then allowing dissemination of it. 
It is clear, then, that computer privacy relates to 
the sharing of information about oneself with others. It is 
not clear, however, how one determines when an invasion of 
privacy by computer has occurred. This determination must 
be made in the courts or by legislative actions. 
Definition of security. The enforcement of laws, rules 
7 
and procedures to maintain a secure data base is the defi¬ 
nition of security used by Stewart Madnick at MIT. A mono¬ 
graph published in 1968 by IBM Corporation defines security 
as the "protection of data from accidental or intentional 
disclosure to unauthorized persons and from unauthorized 
o 
modification." Richard A. Hirschfield views security as a 
problem of comprehensive computer control and, further, 
9 
makes the assertion that most companies do not have it. 
R.W. Conway, W.L. Maxwell, and H.L. Morgan show that 
information security involves the question of procedures to 
insure that privacy decisions are, in fact, enforceable and 
enforced. They warn that computer professionals must insist 
8 
that a security system be an integral part of any informa¬ 
tion system containing potentially sensitive data or the 
computer profession will soon find itself with the same 
problems of conscience that nuclear physicists suffered in 
the late forties. 
The term "data security" has recently been coined. 
Robert Courtney says that data security refers to the safe¬ 
ty of data from all of the unfortuante things which can 
happen to it, like accidental or intentional, but unauthor¬ 
ized, modification, destruction or disclosure.Turn’s 
definition is a bit more encompassing. He says that data 
security is the protection of the computer system resources 
against unauthorized access, use, modification, or destruc¬ 
tion, as V7ell as against attempts to prevent authorized use 
of the system. 
The definitions of security and data security, are 
more concrete than the definition of privacy. Although an¬ 
alysts developing a security plan must be concerned with 
preventing the modification or destruction of data, they 
cannot forget that information will be shared, which re¬ 
quires that the relationships between privacy issues and 
security issues be clearly understood before comprehensive 
security systems can be developed. 
Privacy and security relationship. The relationship 
between privacy and security is not well defined. Security 
is a systems problem and privacy is a legalistic and/or 
9 
moral issue. Security is concerned with unauthorized access 
to data, but so is privacy. Preventing the unintentional 
alteration of data is a security concern, but when data is 
altered it could be a privacy issue. 
For example, consider the case of a disgruntled pro¬ 
grammer employed by a credit reporting agency. Before leav¬ 
ing the firm's employment, assume that he modifies a com¬ 
puter program to systematically alter credit files. In 
addition, assume that this is not uncovered until a large 
number of people have been denied credit based on these 
modified ratings. 
An invasion of privacy has occurred as well as a se¬ 
curity breach. The privacy invasion resulted from incor¬ 
rect information being supplied about individuals and the 
security breach occurred when the programmer modified the 
program. Adequate controls could have prevented this situ¬ 
ation which clearly involves both privacy and security. 
If we could enumerate the entire set of issues under 
the headings security and privacy we would find some over¬ 
lap. The extent of that overlap and the size of each set 
is open to discussion and further research. However, the 
two problems in abstract form appear quite like Figure 2-1 
Security and Privacy Relationships 
Figure 2-1 
10 
Martin has suggested that privacy cannot be insured 
without security, and most of the technica] methods of 
13 
achieving privacy are also essential for security. This 
supports the relationship stated above. But can a secure 
system insure privacy? The answer could be no if a total¬ 
ly secure system is used to store personal information on 
individuals and that information is used improperly. An, 
example of such a system might be a credit reporting agen¬ 
cy that fails to allow the consumer to correct his records. 
In systems development, analysts must be concerned with two 
questions: 1) will this system insure the individual’s 
privacy? and 2) does use of this system constitute an in¬ 
vasion of the individual's privacy? All systems must be 
developed with heavy emphasis on security but still main¬ 
tain a proper balance between the two issues. 
Interest in computer privacy issues has intensified 
to the point that President Gerald Ford signed a bill into 
law on December 27, 1974, which regulates federal data¬ 
banks.^^ Although security is the main issue of this study, 
its relationship to privacy and the increased government 
concern requires that an underlying consideration be given 
to privacy in developing solutions to all security problems. 
While in the remainder of this chapter the most important 
security problems will be examined, privacy will only be 
discussed when it directly applies to the particular secur¬ 
ity problem being presented. 
11 
The organization found in the remainder of this chapter 
is not historical. Research on security and privacy issues 
has been occurring along many fronts during the past decade 
which makes it difficult and confusing to attempt to pre¬ 
sent this research in chronological order. 
Instead, the next section will present a discussion of 
threats which are defined as any event that can cause harm 
to the computer or data stored in the computer. Then a pre- 
sentation of the most important classes of countemieasures, 
which can be defined as any device or procedure that can 
prevent a threat from occurring or minimize its effect should 
it occur, will be given. While logic might suggest that 
threats and countermeasures be paired up they cannot always 
be matched so the subjects will be discussed individually. 
Following the discussion of threats and counterm.easures, 
some miscellaneous topics will be presented. Finally, a 
summary of the security problem will be presented. 
Threats 
Much of the early vrork in computer security v/as in the 
development of possible threats to the computer system and 
the data that the systemi stores. At the Spring Joint Com¬ 
puter Conference in 1967, Ware introduced the first session 
to have ever been presented on computer security to the 
computer conference. He presented a figure of a typical 
12 
resource-sharing computer system (Figure 2-2) and explained 
15 
where threats originated. 
Ware enumerated a number of threat sources: 1) fail¬ 
ures in hardware and software, 2) intruders attempting to 
tap communication lines and pick up system radiation, or 3) 
illegally accessing, copying, or stealing files. Of prime 
importance. Ware emphasized, are threats originating from 
personnel within the computer center. Operators, program¬ 
mers , and maintenance engineers have freer access to the 
system than other groups of individuals which gives them 
16 
mere opportunity to breach the computer system. 
Threat seriousness. Ware continued, depends on the 
sensitivity of information being handled, class of users, 
operating environment, and design skill of the systems de¬ 
velopers. Systems developers must protect against all types 
of invasions suggested plus those not yet conceived. 
H.E. Petersen and Turn classify threats as accidental 
or deliberate. Examples of accidental threats include oper¬ 
ation errors and "Acts of God." Further, they classify de- 
17 
liberate disclosures as either passive or active. For 
example, v/iretapping or electromagnetic pickup is passive. 
Theft is active. According to Petersen and Turn, communi¬ 
cation lines are the most vulnerable system part for both 
18 
active and passive threats. 
Risk measurement. Risk measurement is not easy. Each 
computer installation presents several possible risks or 
13 
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threats. Associated with each risk is a difficult-to-mea- 
sure occurrence probability. Yet, we must measure potential 
risk to insure adequate security. 
Richard B. Canning and Robert Courtney suggest that 
rough estimates and guesses make more sense than no esti- 
19 
mate at all. Courtney shows that the economic value of 
any protective device often exceeds its cost--even if we 
20 
overestimate the threat probability. 
James Martin suggests a relatively simple procedure 
for determining a "security exposure rating." (See Table 2 
1) First, the user should establish a matrix to list pos¬ 
sible threats down the side and results, such as "inability 
to process" and "loss of single records," across the top. 
Next, the matrix would be filled in for each application 
with a rating for the approximate probability of an event 
occurring, P, as defined in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1 
Probability Ratings 
P: Rating for the probability of an event occurring: 
0: Virtually impossible 
1: Might happen once in 400 years 
2: Might happen once in 40 years 
3; Might happen once in 4 years (1000 working days) 
4: Might happen once in 100 days 
5: Might happen once in 10 days 
6: Might happen once a day 
7: Might happen 10 times a day 
15 
A duplicate matrix will be filled in with a rating, D, 
for the amount of damage the event causes in lost business, 
cost of correcting the data, and other costs as approxi¬ 
mated in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2 
Damage Ratings 
D: Rating for the amount of damage the event causes in 
lost business, cost of correcting the data, and 
other costs; 
0: Negligible (about $1) 
1: On the order of $10 
2: On the order of $100 
3: On the order of $1,000 
4: On the order of $10,000 
5: On the order of $100,000 
6: On the order of $1,000,000 
7; On the order of $10,000,000 
Finally, the exposure rating, E, is obtained for each 
event from: 
E 
(P+D-3) 
4 
dollars per year when P 
and D 0. 
E provides a measure for determining which problems should 
have the greatest attention paid to them. 
2 
A different approach is suggested by Javier Kuong. 
His "risk analysis and evaluation of protection programs 
16 
is presented in Figure 2-3. 
To employ Kuong's procedure, the user must first pre¬ 
pare a list of all possible threats that might occur. For 
each threat an estimate of the cost of impact of the threat 
must be made and an estimate of the frequency, or the prob¬ 
ability of occurrence, made as well. When three estimates 
of each are used, the expected cost of the event, , and 
the expected risk, , are calculated as: 
^ a+4m+c . 
= —g- , and 
R = 
e 
a+4m+c 
where a is the minimum estimate, c is the maximum estimate, 
and m is the middle estimate. Otherwise, C. and R are the 
1 e 
original estimate. 
The expected loss, C^, for that threat is found from: 
C„ = C, X R 
E 1 e 
The user should determine all alternative protection 
methods and select the one that he believes to be most effec¬ 
tive in fighting off this thre,at. Its cost estimate will be 
Cp. Any intangible factors in favor of protection will be 
quantified as Finally, the incentive for adopting the 
protective measure, I, is obtained from: 
I = Cg- Cp (+Cp^) 
As stated before, this procedure is done for all 
threats. The user should then adopt all protective measures 
DATA OTHER LITERATURE 
Figure 2-3 
Risk Analysis And Evaluation of Protection Programs 
18 
for which I > 0 unless, of course, other priorities must be 
considered. 
A Mathematical model of protector-intruder strategies 
is suggested by Rein Turn and Norman Z. Shapiro which re¬ 
quires that the value of information stored in the data base 
to the protector and to the intruder be estimated. As an 
example, they select a "mailing list," L, of N information 
items, each of v/hich has the market value k. The total mar¬ 
ket value of L is: 
V = kN 
If the intruder must make an investment, X, to penetrate 
the data base and requires a minimum profit, rX, v/here r > 0, 
then his maximum investment to obtain L is: 
X = kN/(l+r) 
To counter this threat, the protector spends Y resources on 
data security measures, so the problem becomes one of de¬ 
termining Y. 
Let I(X,Y) be the expected amount of information ob¬ 
tained by the intruder when he expends X amount of resources 
to overcome Y amount invested by the protector. Some of the 
elementary properties of I(X,Y) are: 
1(0,Y) = KX,^) =0, for X,Y > 0 
I(X,Y) is monotone non-decreasing in X and 
monotone non-increasing in Y. 
Letting f(N) be the value to the intruder of N units of in- 
19 
formation and g(N) be the cost to the protector and subjects 
of the same N units of information, the expected net profit 
of the intruder, v(X,Y) is; 
v(X,Y) = f(I(X,Y))-X 
while the net loss to the protector and subjects, u(X,Y), 
is: 
u(X,Y) = g(I(X,Y))+Y 
Given that the intruder would want to maximize his prof 
it, he would vary X until v(X,Y) is at a maximum. Conversly 
the protector would want to minimize u(X,Y) by varying Y. 
The selected values of X and Y will satisfy: 
f'(I(X,Y))BI(X,Y)/9X=1, and 
g'(I(X,Y))8I(X,Y)/aY = -1 
Of course, the Turn and Shapiro approach requires that 
many analytical or empirical expressions be developed to ex¬ 
press these relationships, many of which might be difficult 
to construct. Although their model is built on the value of 
data to a possible intruder, it might be possible to modify 
the model slightly to substitute the cost of reconstructing 
in the event of a fire or some other threat for the in¬ 
truder's investment, X. 
It is apparent from the above discussion that the mea¬ 
surement of risk is much more of an art than a science. The 
great number of possible threats that must be enumerated in 
the Martin and Kuong approaches comprise an infinite list. 
Even selecting the ones most applicable to a particular in- 
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stallation is extremely difficult. 
While Turn and Shapiro offer a different approach, the 
measurement of the market value of data is often difficult. 
All three approaches offer interesting starting points to 
additional work that must be done to refine the processes. 
Research and statistical databanks. With the great 
amount of data collected for research or statistical pur¬ 
poses increasing rapidly, the concern over what that inform¬ 
ation will be used for is also increasing. People are be¬ 
ginning to believe that by answering questionnaires they are 
creating a threat to their own privacy. Social researchers 
are aware of this problem and believe that unless they are 
able to keep identifiable data confidential that their 
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ability to collect data will suffer. 
This problem has long been a concern of the United 
States Bureau of the Census. In fact, the census law 
(Title 13, U.S.C., Sec. 9-a-2) provides that there shall 
not be any publication (or other revealing of information) 
whereby the data furnished by any particular establishment 
. . 25 
or undividual under this title can be identified. Al¬ 
though the census bureau has an unblemished record, a num¬ 
ber of suggestions for concealing research data have ap¬ 
peared. One suggestion is to randomly modify data that is 
distributed for statistical purposes. This would not 
affect the research outcome but would mask the raw data. 
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1. dossier information 
A procedure employing statistical data to ascertain 
dossier information was described in an article by Lance 
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Hoffman and V7.F. Miller. They contend that if we know a 
number of properties about an individual we can use the 
databank to find out additional information. Say, for ex¬ 
ample, we want to know if John Doe earns over $50,000 per 
year. We know that he is a 39-year-old lawyer living in 
New York City with his second wife and their four children. 
We can ask the data bank, "how many people are there in the 
data bank with the following properties: 
Age 39 
Education level LLB 
Male 
Has four children 
Lives in New York City 
Profession is Lawyer 
Has been married twice?" 
Assxame it responds with the answer "57 people." Then we 
ask the same question but add the property "salary exceeds 
$50,000 per year." If the response is "57" we then know 
2 8 
that he earns greater than $50,000 per year. 
Similar questioning can create an entire dossier on 
the individual in question. In fact, if the properties 
selected yield a cell size of one, then those inquiries 
with one additional property will return a "1" if the 
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property is true and a "0" if the property is false. To 
protect against this type of disclosure is nearly impossi- 
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ble and many would say that it is impossible. Hoffman 
and Miller suggest that threat monitoring might be the only 
way to protect against this type of attack. 
2. Private information 
As the researcher creates his data base he must not 
attempt to collect data in a way that might be thought of 
as privacy invasion. Although no definitive statement ex¬ 
ists which provides a clear statement of what is "private 
information," or what constitutes an "unwarranted invasion 
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of privacy," Edward V. Comber has suggested that re¬ 
searchers must take into account whether or not disclosure 
of the specific data: 1) would relate to an individual, a 
family or other small group in such a manner as to increase 
the probability of the unwarranted identification of the in¬ 
dividuals, or 2) the data is not considered public informa¬ 
tion by provision of legal statute, or 3) would cause or be 
the basis for unjust economic loss or social stigma or 
harrassment to the individual, or 4) result in the unneces¬ 
sary loss of a property right. 
Threats, as has been shown, include threats to the 
computer system as well as threats to an individual's pri¬ 
vacy. Many of them are caused by the computer environment 
but a great number result from humans attempting to use the 
computer system improperly or to access data which they are 
not authorized to see. 
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It is impossible to enumerate all threats. It is, how¬ 
ever, possible to classify threats and suggest countermea¬ 
sures for various classes of threats from the environment 
or from humans. 
Countermeasures 
To thwart a threat to the system, Petersen and Turn 
offer five classes of countermeasures: 1) access management, 
2) processing restriction, 3) threat monitoring, 4) privacy 
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transformations, and 5) integrity management. Access man¬ 
agement is defined as preventing unauthorized users from 
obtaining services from the system or gaining access to its 
files. Included in this class are such things as the use 
of passwords and various other authorization techniques. 
Processing restrictions, imposed on files containing 
sensitive information, are used to protect files from access 
or illegal alteration. They can also be used to prevent 
users from accessing various sections of storage in which 
sensitive information or the operating system might reside. 
Threat monitoring is the detection of attempted or 
actual penetrations of the system or files either to provide 
a real-time response or to permit ex post facto analysis. In¬ 
cluded in this class of countermeasures are audits and logs 
which can provide "alarms" to an attempted penetration or 
an ongoing attack. 
The fourth countermeasure, privacy transformations, in- 
24 
eludes techniques for coding the data communications between 
the user and the processor or concealing the actual informa¬ 
tion held in certain files. Petersen and Turn point out 
that this countermeasure offers substantial protection 
against certain threats but also note the increase In pro¬ 
cessing required of the system. 
The final class, integrity management, refers to the 
verification that the system software and hardware perform 
as specified and includes the verification of the perform¬ 
ance of personnel and the communication channels. This is 
the most difficult class of countermeasures to develop. 
Physical security m>easures. Physical security measures 
have been discussed extensively in the computer trade jour¬ 
nals, but little mention is made of them in academic jour¬ 
nals. This can be explained by noting the mundane usage of 
physical security measures. Research cannot be done by com¬ 
puter scientists to determine the best lock to be put on a 
computer room door or the most effective vault type for the 
storage of backup files. 
Perhaps another reason that academicians do not study 
physical security measures is that there isn't much more 
that needs to be known about them. Their costs are easily 
estimated and the effectiveness of the devices has been de¬ 
termined to meet defined specifications leaving little mys¬ 
tery about them. 
However, physical security measures are important, even 
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if they are mundane. They must be considered as part of any 
security plan. Without some basic physical security mea¬ 
sures, large funds put into securing the operation system or 
enciphering data files are worthless. 
James Martin breaks physical security problems down in¬ 
to six distinct areas and devotes a chapter to each. These 
chapters are: 1) Locks, Vaults, and Protected Areas, 2) 
Electronic Security Devices and Systems, 3) Fire and Acts 
of God, 4) Sabotage, 5) Communication-line Wiretapping, and 
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6) Electromagnetic Radiation and System Eavesdropping. 
In the first chapter, Martin discusses what types of 
things should be in a protected area and how it should be 
protected. He includes the National Fire Protection Asso- 
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ciation recommendations for vaults and considerations 
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about locks and fire alarms. All of these items are de- 
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scribed in numerous other sources and several "horror 
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stories" have demonstrated the value of the devices. 
A number of electronic security devices and systems 
are marketed to prevent a variety of threats to the computer 
center. Those devices include burglar alarms, fire detec¬ 
tors, water-flow detectors, and remote controlled televi¬ 
sion cameras. Martin discusses each of these and their 
applicability. 
Threats from fire and Acts of God, most feared by data 
processing managers, can be minimized by employing effective 
physical security measures and locating the computer in- 
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stallation in a less vulnerable location. Publications 
about these disasters have been directed at preventing them 
from happening and, if they should occur, minimizing the 
potential loss. 
Few computer installations protect against sabotage, 
yet virtually every installation is threatened by possible 
sabotage. In one manufacturing firm, power to the computer 
center was cut by a man whose sister was killed in an auto- 
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mobile accident on the way to work. This act resulted 
from the confused belief of the saboteur that because the 
woman worked for the company that a destructive action 
would vindicate her death. This example, and many similar 
instances, demonstrate the difficulty of protecting against 
sabotage. 
Communication-line wiretapping is of little concern to 
some computer users, but to others it is vitally important. 
As previously noted, Petersen and Turn suggest that wire- 
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tapping can be "active" or "passive." Physical procedures 
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for controlling wiretapping are discussed in Martin and 
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Harry Katzan. 
Finally, electromagnetic radiation and system eaves¬ 
dropping are accomplished by bugging devices, by cameras, 
by picking up wastepaper, by visual eavesdropping, and by 
electronic methods. Martin suggests many controls to mini¬ 
mize these threats from occurring which include isolation 
of computer centers, shredding-of wastepaper, and restricting 
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entrance to computer centers. 
Physical security measures might also be employed to 
insure the reliability of the computer system. Clearly, it 
is essential that the computer perform in the manner that 
it was designed to perform. Any deviation from that per¬ 
formance can result in disastrous security breaches. Reli¬ 
ability lias always been an issue to computer manufacturers 
but it becomes a security problem, as well, if data in the 
system can be modified or destroyed due to the unreliabil¬ 
ity of the computer system. 
In many cases, generalized rules can be suggested 
which are adequate for all installations as long as careful 
consideration of the possible risk associated with each 
event is clearly understood. 
Authorization procedures. As computer systems have 
grown in complexity, the requirements for efficient operat- 
ing systems l\avo grown. At the same time, the number of 
users sliaring a computer system and the number of ways in 
wliich they use the system have also grown. The operating 
system .is often called upon to grant or deny access to data 
stored in the system or stored on hardware controlled by 
the system. Authorization considerations are, perhaps, the 
most complex problem to be considered in the design of 
multi-user systems. 
The problem is one of restricting access to various 
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resources of the system based on a "need to know" philos¬ 
ophy. These restrictions, controlled by the operating sys¬ 
tem, can be placed on: 1) the users of the system, 2) use 
of terminals or other input/output devices, 3) use of appli¬ 
cation programs, 4) use of data sets or data elements, and 
44 
5) use of selected volumes of the data files. 
While most systems have been built on the premise of 
restricting access to various segments of the system, re¬ 
cent consideration has been given to building the procedures 
based on privileges to be granted to the user. Therefore, 
if a user requires certain devices, and/or data, he can 
access them only if he has the proper privileges. V^hen 
there are errors in the granting of privileges they are re¬ 
ported quite quickly, while with the other approach, some 
access errors might never be found. 
When access is restricted, the problem of being able 
to properly identify the user is encountered. The three 
ways in which a person can be identified are: 1) by som.e 
physical personal characteristic, 2) by something he knows 
45 
or memorizes, and 3) by something he carries. The last 
two of these procedures can easily be bypassed by other than 
the authorized user by theft or knowing the same facts, while 
the first procedure cannot be. In both cases, the probabili¬ 
ty of a false rejection or a false acceptance must be mini¬ 
mized. 
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1. Identification systems 
Systems that authorize use of the computer system by 
some personal characteristic are referred to as identifi¬ 
cation systems. They use finger prints, voice prints, or 
finger length to positively identify the potential user. 
More exotic measurements such as head size or lip prints 
have also been suggested. These procedures have a very low 
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probability of error, and are the most effective. Cur¬ 
rently, their use is restricted to military operations and 
only the most sensitive commercial applications. 
Most common of the three identification procedures is 
identification by something the user knows or memorizes. 
In the most widely used systems, a user signs on with his 
user number and a password. If he enters the wrong pass¬ 
word he can be shut off the system or given the opportun¬ 
ity to try again. Edward C. Glaser notes that two diffi¬ 
culties are that obvious passwords are used and passwords 
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are stored in obvious places. 
To combat these problems some installations issue a 
new password each month, but this only gives a day or two 
of protection as the passwords are again put in their ob¬ 
vious places. Bernard Peters has suggested the use of 
"once-only" codes. With this procedure the user is given 
a list of codes each month which he uses in order as he 
signs on. The primary problem with this system is that it 
requires a large amount of storage space for the password 
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lists. 
Les Earnest proposes that a random number, x, be sup¬ 
plied after the user logs in. On x the user would perform 
some mental transformation, T, to yield y = T(x). He then 
inputs y, which the computer certifies. A wiretapper would 
only have access to x and y, making it nearly impossible to 
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determine T. 
Others have suggested that the password be something 
that the user knows, such as his mother's maiden name. The 
computer would store a number of facts about the individual 
and randomly select a fact at sign-on. Like "once-only" 
codes, this requires a great deal of storage space. 
Identification by something carried is the least effec¬ 
tive procedure but also the least costly. Usually the item 
carried is a key, a card much like a credit card, or a badge. 
A key, of course, would be used to turn on a terminal much 
like the ignition of a car. Badges and cards are either 
optically or magnetically encoded and are placed in a term- 
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inal to be read. Regardless of the obvious problem that 
they can be lost or stolen, the use of cards can be expected 
to grow quite rapidly due to their ease of operation. 
2. Authorization techniques 
A number of authorization techniques have been suggested 
v/hich may or may not have been developed with a specific op¬ 
erating system in mind. Some of the most important are 
based on authority items, authorization tables, access ma- 
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trices, and Lance Hoffman's "formularies." 
D.K. Hsiao suggested and implemented files which con¬ 
tain authority items used to control access to records in 
the files. His work represents the first working system 
which controls access at a level lower than the file 
level. 
In Hsiao's system, one authority item is associated 
with each user. Within the authority item, logical expres¬ 
sions indicate for each file which records are inaccess- 
able, which are temporarily blocked, and which are pres- 
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ently opened for use. In addition, the user can create 
a procedure associated with a file that he owns to control 
access by other users. This idea was expanded upon by 
Hoffman. 
Authorization tables have been suggested as proce¬ 
dures for controlling what each user is permitted to do or 
which give other permissible relationships. They can con¬ 
trol access by specifying: 1) transaction types, 2) pro¬ 
grams, 3) data sets available for reading, 4) data sets 
that the user can modify, and 5) data sets in which the 
user can insert or delete records.The tables have an 
entry for each user defining what he is entitled to do. 
An access matrix is much like an authorization table. 
The columns represent objects which are entities to which 
access must be controlled while the rows represent sub¬ 
jects which are active entities whose access to ol)jocts 
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must be controlled. Included in the matrix is a decision 
rule establishing access relationships between the subjects 
and objects. 
5 6 
It has been suggested that a number of characteris¬ 
tics of security matrices make it difficult, if not impos¬ 
sible, to implement authorization techniques that employ 
security matrices. Among those reasons are the following: 
1) there are usually more objects than subjects, 2) the 
matrix is sparse, 3) two or more rows may be identical, 
4) two or more columns may be identical, and 5) many matrix 
entries are identical. 
Conway, Maxwell, and Morgan suggest that a practical 
implementation of the security matrix concept can be suc¬ 
cessfully accomplished if one or more of three suggestions 
are employed. First, the size of the matrix might be re¬ 
duced. Secondly, it m.ight be possible to simplify the en¬ 
tries in the matrix from the general "decision rule" to a 
binary yes-no indication. Finally, through a careful an¬ 
alysis of when and how the matrix should be interrogated, 
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implementation might be made easier. 
Hoffman's "formulary" approach was developed as part 
of his Ph.D. dissertation at Stanford University. The de¬ 
cision of whether a user can read, write, update, etc., 
data is controlled by programs (referred to as "formular¬ 
ies") which can be completely independent of the contents 
or locations of raw data in the data base. The decision to 
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grant or deny access can be made at data access time, not 
only at file creation time as has usually been the case in 
, I ,58 
the past. 
The basic idea behind the formulary method is that a 
user, a terminal, and a previously built formulary must be 
linked together in order for a user to perform information 
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storage, retrieval, and/or manipulative operations. 
Hoffman's method has a number of desirable characteristics: 
1) no arbitrary processing constraint is imposed on data or 
programs, 2) the method allows control of individual data 
elements, 3) no extra storage or time is required to de¬ 
scribe data which the user does not desire to protect, and 
4) the method is machine-independent and independent of 
file structure.Many of the concepts found in Hoffman's 
"formulary" approach are being used in the development of 
newer operating systems. 
Authorization procedures in operating systems are an 
important part of any security package. Without them, or 
with weak authorization procedures, the value of the com¬ 
plete security package is diminished and can represent one 
type of integrity violation. 
3. Data integrity 
Peter Browne tells us that data integrity is the in- 
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suring of accuracy and completeness in data files. To 
insure this accuracy and completeness, all components of 
the computer system must be working as they were designed 
34 
to work, including software and hardware. 
The definition of integrity is expanded by Barry R. 
Borgerson to include two types of possible integrity vio¬ 
lations: 1) one process can interfere with another pro¬ 
cess, and 2) the state of a single process can be errone¬ 
ously changed without any interference from another pro- 
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cess. He includes programs as well as data files in 
his definition. 
It is possible to define integrity by employing the 
"single failure principle" found in Stephen W. Leibholz 
and Louis D. Wilson. This principle states that "it should 
not be possible to lose data through any single failure in 
the system even though that failure occurs during operation 
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and goes undetected for some period of time." The word 
"lose" is defined to include any bad thing that can happen 
to data. 
The integrity of the computer system and the data 
within it are of great concern to developers of operating 
systems. In the event that the operating system cannot 
guarantee the integrity of the data and programs, then the 
computer system is of little value to the user. 
Because of these concerns, integrity interfaces with 
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computer security at almost every point. Without integ¬ 
rity, security is inadequate, and without security, integ¬ 
rity is inadequate. Therefore, virtually all discussions 
about security relate to integrity, and the reverse is true 
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as well. 
4. Examples 
Identifying the user, as well as the devices and fil'es 
that he will be able to use, is generally the domain of the 
operating system. Much research has been done on the pro¬ 
cedures to be used in the development of a secure operating 
system and also in actually creating a system that works. 
It has been suggested that not only must the operating 
system protect itself, it must provide an authorization 
function to allov/ only approved combinations of individual's, 
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programs, and files to be coupled for execution. Because 
this requirement is not always found in commercially avail¬ 
able operating systems, many institutions have found it necessary 
to attenpt to develop their own secure operating system. 
MULTICS and ADEPT-50 are good examples. 
MULTICS (Multiplexed Information and Computing Ser- 
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vice) was developed at Massachusetts Institute of Tech¬ 
nology. It serves as a case study of protection mechanisms 
which can permit controlled sharing of information in an on¬ 
line, general-purpose, information-storing system. Five 
principles underlie the protection scheme developed: 1) 
base the protection mechanisms on permission rather than 
exclusion, 2) check every access to every object for cur¬ 
rent authority, 3) design the security system so that the 
protection mechanisms are not secret, 4) incorporate the 
principle of least privilege (every program and every pri- 
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vileged user of the system should operate using the least 
amount of privilege necessary to complete the job, and 5) 
design the human interface for naturalness, ease of use, 
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and simplicity. 
To insure data protection, MULTICS incorporates G. 
Scott Graham's rings of protection as the authorization 
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procedure. Essentially, Graham suggests a hierarchical 
structure for data and programs which requires that data 
and programs be stored in a hierarchical relationship based 
on the sensitivity of the data and/or programs. 
Figure 2-4 
Graham's Rings of Protection 
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All users would have access to the items stored in the out¬ 
ermost ring and only the most privileged users would have 
access to the innermost ring. Control is at the file level, 
which has some limitations that will be discussed later. 
Surprisingly, access to MULTICS is through a password 
system. This password system is highly controlled, however, 
and gives the user the option of changing his password at 
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any time. Should an intruder be able to successfully ob¬ 
tain the user's number and password, he could change the 
password and prevent the legitimate user from accessing the 
system. This is a substantial flaw. To counter illegal access 
attempts, at each login the user is given the time, place, 
and location of the previous login so that the user is made 
aware of someone else using his number. 
ADEPT-50 is a resource sharing system designed to 
handle sensitive information in classified government and 
military facilities. Included in the security objectives 
of the system are the following: 1) the security control 
mechanism must support heterogeneous levels and types of 
classifications, 2) the security control mechanism must be 
unclassified, 3) the security control mechanism must be con¬ 
structed so that it might be carefully scrutinized for cor- • 
rectness, completeness, and reliability, and 4) the secur- 
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ity control system mechanism be as frugal as possible. 
The two major components in the system are security 
objects and security properties. Security objects are de- 
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fined as users, terminals, jobs, and files. Each security 
object is described by a security profile that is an ordered 
triplet of the security properties, authority, category, and 
franchise. Authority is a set of hierarchically ordered 
security justifications. Category is a set of discrete se¬ 
curity justifications. Franchise is a set of users licensed 
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with privileged secrutiy jurisdiction. 
The security profile is defined in a matrix which has 
objects in the rows and properties in the columns. Based on 
the user number, his terminal, his job, and the requested 
files, the proper security profile is selected and the con¬ 
straints of that profile govern his level of accessability 
to the various components of the system. 
Encipherment of data. One of the most technical areas 
in computer security is data encipherment, often referred 
to as cryptography or privacy transformations. Early work 
in cryptography was completed far before computers existed 
so that many of the early developed techniques cannot be 
easily applied to computer technology. Cryptography is 
highly specialized and a large body of technical literature 
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has been devoted to the subject. Its presentation here is 
designed to present an overview of its application to com¬ 
puter technology. 
1. Privacy transformations 
Turn defines "privacy transformation" as being synon¬ 
ymous with "cryptographic transformation." It was coined 
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in the early days of computer security research to distin¬ 
guish the use of cryptographic techniques in civilian and 
commercial systems from their use for protecting classified 
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national defense information. 
Privacy transformations represent one technique for 
providing data security - the mathematical/logical trans¬ 
formation of the protected data into forms which are unin¬ 
telligible to all but the holders of the "keys" to the 
transformations, i.e., those who know what inverse trans- 
formations to apply. To employ the techniques of crypto¬ 
graphy or privacy transformations we must have a plaintext, 
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a cipher or cryptogram, and a key. The plaintext is the 
input message while the cipher or cryptogram is the output 
message. It is necessary to have the key to be able to 
convert from the cipher or cryptogram back to the plaintext. 
When the key is missing, cryptanalysis, the art of resolv¬ 
ing cipher into their plain texts without having possession 
of the key, must be employed. 
Essentially, there are two main classes of privacy 
transformations: 1) replacement of characters in the data 
by other characters (or groups of characters), and 2) trans- 
7 8 
position of the order of the characters. Another method, 
compression, is generally not considered a cryptographic 
technique although its associated confidentiality protec- 
79 
tion may be sufficient in mild threat environments, 
marily, compression is used to reduce the redundancy in 
Pri- 
40 
stored or transmitted data by removing repeated consecutive 
characters. 
2, Hardware 
In addition to research on privacy transformations, 
much work has been done with the development of encipherment 
ic techniques for terminals. Martin suggests that crypto¬ 
graphy at terminals is perhaps more likely to be done by 
8 0 
hardware than software. As an exanple, one manufacturer markets a 
hardware device for terminals referred to as "Lucifer" which 
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can encipher or decipher messages up to 128 bits in length. 
3. Costs 
The operation of cryptographic hardware and software 
is, of course, not without its associated costs of one-time 
hardware purchase and software development, hardware opera¬ 
tion, and degradation resulting from performing the privacy 
transformation. Of these three, the last is the most diffi¬ 
cult to measure. Degradation varies depending on the type 
of privacy transformation employed. Some measures greatly 
increase processing time while others only moderately in¬ 
crease processing time. Actual degradation is also depen¬ 
dent on the computer system that it runs on because the in¬ 
ternal processing speed of the equipment can alter the 
effectiveness of the transformation. 
Turn reports on work done by William A. Garrison and 
C.V. Ramamoorthy in which they estimated the increased com¬ 
puter time requirements to be 0.66% for a one-time Verman 
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ciphering, 3.5% for table look-up Vigenere ciphering, and 
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6.3% for the modulo arithmetic Vigenere cipher. He 
points out, however, that these cost figures (obtained on a 
CDC 6600 computer) are quite sensitive to the type of in¬ 
formation retrieval system and that a systematic effort to 
compile a comprehensive data base of security system costs 
8 3 
and decreases in functional capability is clearly needed. 
Theodore D. Friedman and Hoffman conducted five experiments 
to measure CPU time on a CDC 6400 required by additive en¬ 
cryption methods programmed both in assembly language and 
in FORTRAN: a "null transformation" to measure the time to 
move data without encryption, encryption with a one-word 
key, encryption with a 125 word key, double key encryption, 
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and encryption using a pseudo-random key. They defined the 
term "encryption time coefficient" (ETC) as the ratio of en¬ 
cryption time to the time taken to move data without encryp- 
tion. ^ Their results suggest that transformations coded in 
FORTRAN will take over twice as long to move the data as 
will those coded in assembly language (ETC of 9.96 versus 
4.21). Increases in CPU time for the routine employed can 
be expected to range from zero to approximately ten times, 
^ ^ • -1 86 
depending on the transformation and programming language. 
4. Criteria 
Dennis Van Tassel suggests a set of criteria for com¬ 
puter-based encipherment systems. It should not be neces¬ 
sary to keep the method secret, only the keys. The amount 
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of secrecy obtained should be directly related to the amount 
of computing time necessary to use the system. The method 
should destroy the statistical parameters or natural struc¬ 
ture of the language. Finally, an error should not destroy 
8 7 
successive information. ' 
Systems designers must be aware of the suitability of 
a particular class of privacy transformations so that the 
system designed does not suffer a great performance loss. 
This suitability depends on: 1) the relevant characteris¬ 
tics of the particular application, 2) the inherent charac¬ 
teristics of the class of privacy transformations used, and 
3) the technical aspects of the system that implements the 
. 8 8 
application and the privacy transformation. 
Turn tells us that effectiveness and costs must be 
weighted against the estimated value of the protected in¬ 
formation in order to implement a rational protection sys- 
tem--one that provides a level of data security warranted 
by the value of the protected information. This might 
explain why privacy transformations have only found minor 
use in industry but have been used heavily in military op- 
^ . 90 erations. 
As the use of network processing expands, and with it 
the transmitting of more sensitive information over commun¬ 
ications lines, we can expect to see the need and use of 
these techniques grow concurrently. Even today, at least 
one major application of computer technology requires the 
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use of privacy transformations. Banks' cash dispensing 
terminals require that the key be changed after each trans- 
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action at the terminal. Otherwise an intruder would 
only have to tap the line to determine the code for "issue 
cash" and then he could cause the machine to dispense cash 
until it was empty. Additional applications can be expected 
in the future. 
Controls. At the heart of any successful security plan 
is a set of controls to guarantee that the functions men¬ 
tioned in the preceeding pages are, in fact, in operation 
and are used to reduce risk in various environments. The 
use of controls on input/output, processing, hardware, docu¬ 
mentation, administrative functions, systems development, 
and others, is v/ell documented. 
Auditors are nov/ paying particular attention to com¬ 
puter operations. As they have become increasingly concerned 
about control problems in computer operations, auditors have 
extended their concern to security problems. Obviously, 
this concern is quite justified if we accept Thomas W. Por- 
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ter's definition of auditing: 
"Auditing is the examination of information by a 
third party other than the preparer or the user 
with the intent of establishing its reliability 
and the reporting of the results of this examin¬ 
ation v/ith the expectation of increasing the use¬ 
fulness of the information to the user." 
To adequately audit a process, auditors cannot stop when the 
information is put into machine readable form and pick it up 
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when it*s back on paper again. They must be able to insure 
that these controls are in operation throughout the pro¬ 
cess . 
In addition to the auditors* responsibility, top man¬ 
agement must be responsible for the design of the security 
techniques and procedures and responsible for the day-to- 
day operations, given that design.To exercise design 
control, the Bank Administration Institute suggests a num¬ 
ber of procedures broken down into administrative controls, 
system controls, and programming controls.Daily opera¬ 
tions should be controlled through operations controls, 
processing controls, and documentation controls.The 
responsibilities in these areas can be subdivided among 
the data-prccessing manager, the security administrator, 
local security officers, file owners, line managers, and 
A_ll of these controls should be part of the security 
plan- Joseph J. Wassezrman suggests a hierarchical struc- 
o *7 
tore of conorcls.*' If the user can answer "yes" to all 
twelve cf his conorol questions, Kasserman then says that 
he has a veil-controlled system. Others, such as Canning,'^ 
have also exnlored ohe use of controls in security plans. 
ICiscellaneous Topics 
Sn^nistioal models- One of the perplexing problems 
esearoners aotemc-ting to prevent privacy threats from 
^ t:hcy ovxtx^vU^ to t hv> 
:srL5 of i::^ 5it\u^,U>j5 AUxi 
iox 00:10? fo vhioh oho ooh^oot?' iv^.ont ity vNtmu>t bo 
oloooo, ^^ofvoro ?. ^r^moh ho? ou^ox'^otov^ thvoo ?tvAtoxy\o 
orooo?? v^t r>orx>i5'ixj ivoorxi^ Mom 
^ ** ^ 
. 's tialitv ‘f the roo\>i\b^ i? 
_ov or oi:?t:Oiiii, 
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lr?'iiloto5 v'loto bank j^oc’ol* In tho first 
more-- 
or r r 
resoarrher ha? oollootod a file of information 
iaral? vhich vill bo referred to a? A with ixionti 
therefore, ve have a set of n recorvi? Ov^ch con 
mrlete the research, the x'esearcher 
mrsr rsa B Irfcmaricr from another aqencv to whom he does 
rcr wc:   ^c revea— he AI file is encoded on A to give 
A-'Z (vrare A’ is -the encoded A) 'which is given to the agen¬ 
cy- rc rerce wirh their BI file. They return a file of A’B 
records vricr are decoded bv the researcher to yield a file 
of A= records. The A5 file, wi-thout identifiers, can then 
lOG Kanv variations of this model exist and Boruch 
describes sore of them. 
b. Brokerage model. The brokerage model assumes 
that the researcher does not want to give his file to the 
agencj" for merging. Ke hires a broker to act as an inter¬ 
mediary’- File A* I is given to the broker instead of the 
agency. The agency^ encodes file BI on B and gives B'l to 
the broker. The broker -then merges the files and deletes 
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the identifiers to yield A'B' which goes to the agency for 
decoding onB. The agency returns file A'B to the research¬ 
er for decoding into AB. Although this model is much like 
the insulated data bank model, the agency has been relieved 
of the task of merging while the broker works with data 
that cannot be interrogated by them.Again, Boruch de¬ 
scribes a number of variations. 
c. Linkage model. The third model is used for 
logitudinal studies. Assume that the researcher must col¬ 
lect information yearly on a number of subjects, but that 
in the research their identity must not be known. When the 
first set of questionnaires is returned three files are 
created; 1) a data file with unique identifiers, 2) a name 
and address file with unique identifiers which are differ¬ 
ent from the data file, and 3) a "link" file in which the 
identifiers are matched. Boruch suggests that in extreme 
cases the link file could be stored in a foreign country to 
prevent it from being subpoenaed. 
When a follow-up study must be done, the name and ad¬ 
dress file is used to produce the address labels for the 
questionnaires. Upon return, the questionnaires are ma¬ 
chine prepared with the second identifier. Then this file 
is matched against the link file and the identifiers changed. 
Now the new file, with no reference to name and address, can 
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be used with the original data file. This is essentially 
the procedure employed by the American Council of Education 
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in a study of students attending a national sample of col¬ 
leges and universities in which over a million students 
were sampled in 1966 and follow-up studies done on approx¬ 
imately 250,000 students. 
The collection and use of statistical data remains a 
problem. More frequently the researcher must demonstrate 
that his work will not invade the individual's privacy. In 
many institutions all research projects must be approved by 
a privacy panel. This trend is likely to continue. 
Comprehensive security plans. In the previous pages 
we have discussed various aspects of security and commented 
on some of the people working on security problems. Physi¬ 
cal security problems have been the concern of such people 
as Van Tassel and Martin while highly technical software 
problems are of interest to Hoffman, Turn, Katzan, and 
others. Reviewing all of these problems are the auditors 
such as Porter. 
The missing link is a comprehensive security plan to 
put all of the pieces together into something that the user 
can work with. This need has been perceived by many in¬ 
cluding Leonard Krauss. His book, SAFE, Security Audit and 
Field Evaluation,is essentially a set of checklists to 
be used in setting up a tailor-made security package. Krauss 
provides the user with ratings to be employed and procedures 
for interpreting those ratings. 
His procedures have been adopted by the accounting firm 
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of Ernst and Ernst. They provide a "security audit" ser¬ 
vice in which they analyze a client firm's computer opera¬ 
tion and make suggestions for raising the level of security 
in the operation by reviewing nine potential problem areas. 
A similar service is provided by Peat, Marwick, Mitch- 
elllOS which requires an extensive commitment of money and 
personnel from the client firm. They review ten potential 
problem areas. 
At least one other accounting firm in the "Big Eight," 
Arthur Andersen, offers a similar service as do several con¬ 
sulting firms. 
It should be noted that most of the above are individ¬ 
ualized packages developed based on the user's needs. None 
of the accounting firms sell a "do-it-yourself" package. 
Only SAFE was built to be used solely by the user without 
any outside support. 
Because of the wide variety of computer uses and the 
differing threat environments that they are employed in, se¬ 
curity plans must be built for the individual. Research and 
experiences with certain techniques can suggest how they 
might be used in varying situations, but putting all of the 
pieces together must be done for each user. 
Each user must design his own security plan based on 
the question "What do I need?" Unfortunately, he must also 
be able to answer the question, "How do I know when I've 
got it?"^^*^ as well. This question is as difficult to re- 
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spend to as the first, and it is seldom possible to insure 
that adequate security exists. 
Extent of Concern 
Users are becoming increasingly concerned about computer 
security. A well developed security plan covers all of the 
issues mentioned in the preceding pages and many users are 
concerned that they don't have adequate security. Their 
concern increases when events of computer abuse are reported 
in the trade journals or when they experience them. In this 
section, we will briefly review the computer abuse problem 
and then review how this has influenced concern among users 
and vendors. 
Computer abuse. Computer abuse is defined by Donn 
Parker as "all types of acts distinctly associated with com¬ 
puters or data communications in which victims involuntarily 
suffer or could have suffered losses, injuries or damage or 
in which perpetrators receive or could have received gain."^^ 
Hundreds of examples exist in which programmers, using the 
computer as a sophisticated tool or white collar crime, had 
round-offs deposited to their accounts, stole and sold mail¬ 
ing lists, deposited dividend checks to a programmer's ac¬ 
count, and made payments to non-existent vendors. 
Designed to gather data and report on computer abuse, 
Parker's study investigated nearly 150 different incidents 
of computer abuse. While he believes that the gross 
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amount of crime will grow, Parker is not willing to predict 
that the loss per incident will increase as a direct result 
of the increased use of the computer in the financial and 
industrial community. 
Parker found that often the computer played no part, 
or a trivial part, in the reported computer crime. Also, 
in at least one-half of the reported crimes, collusion oc¬ 
curred, but he did not find any evidence of involvement by 
. . . Ill 
organized crime. 
Parker found cases of computer abuse in newspapers 
which were then verified, if possible, by personal inter¬ 
views, editorials, newspaper clippings, and legal documents, 
among other things. Only 68 of the reported 148 cases have, 
as yet, been verified. This is the first attempt to record 
in any meaningful manner the results of computer abuse. 
Before leaving this topic, we should mention the re¬ 
markable case of Equity Funding Corporation, a large Cali¬ 
fornia-based insurance company. In April of 1973, it was 
reported that high officials of the company had used the 
corporation's computers to create false insurance policies 
and to inflate the apparent financial status of their com- 
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pany. Approximately 60,000 bogus policies were created 
in a period of about three years which will eventually re- 
113 
suit in the loss of nearly $2 billion. 
Although this incident is clearly a case of securities 
swindle, it must also be considered a case of computer abuse 
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because t±ie computer was used as the principle tool in the 
swindle. Because of this event, increased interest has 
been shown in computer auditing and computer security. When 
participants at a conference on auditing and computer secur¬ 
ity are asked why they are there, they most frequently make 
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reference to Equity Funding. 
For a brief detailed discussion of the Equity Funding 
swindle the reader is referred to Christopher Podgus' "Out¬ 
witting the Computer swindle" in the September, 1973, edi¬ 
tion of Computer Decisions. Raymond Dirks, the man who re¬ 
ported the swindle to the New York Insurance Commission, 
and Leonard Gross have published a book on the subject en¬ 
titled, The Great Wall Street Scandal. Both are well worth 
reading. 
Vendor concern. Manufacturers have become increasingly 
aware of their responsibility to provide security to their 
customers. They are aware that they must offer operating 
systems with adequate software protection as well as respond¬ 
ing to individual customer security needs. Therefore, in 
1972, Thomas J. Watson, II, announced that IBM would commit 
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over $40 million to the study of security problems. Part 
of that investment went to a two-year joint study with three 
outside users. In July, 1974, IBM published the results of 
that study. 
The Department of Finance of the State of Illinois, 
participant in the study, published security guidelines for 
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users. They suggest that management establish what data is 
being collected, identify who needs it and why, assess an 
economic value to the data and qualify its worth to out¬ 
siders, review the probabilities of disclosure, and budget 
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accordingly for security-related costs. 
Another participant, TRW Systems, prepared a list of 
187 requirements as a guide in determining whether a system 
is acceptably secure. The requirements were broken down 
into five major areas: separation of programs and data, 
controlled access, identification, surveillance, and hard- 
11 R 
ware and software integrity. 
The third member of the group, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, considered the problem of authorization and 
delegation. Another group at MIT looked at differences in 
security requirements within the fields of education, health 
care delivery, financial institutions, and the service bur- 
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eau industry. 
While the project was costly to IBM and involved much 
research effort at all three locations, the results are not 
monumental. The final seven volume report appears to be a 
collection of interesting papers with no string tying the 
while package together. Apparently little attempt was made 
by IBM to coordinate the efforts of the three groups and 
little, if any, direction given to the group members. 
Although it appears that IBM derived more public rela¬ 
tions from this project than worthwhile research, one must 
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remember that this was only a small part of the over $40 
million that they have committed to computer software and 
hardware security. In addition, they have trained a large 
staff of security technicians to work with top management 
in client companies to make them more aware of security prob- 
lems and to consider the consequences of security breaches. 
The concerns at IBM are being paralleled at other manu¬ 
facturers and computer service vendors. They too, are con¬ 
cerned with the issues of software and hardware protection, 
backup and recovery plans, risk assessment, and all of the 
other security issues. They have not had the public expo¬ 
sure that IBM has had, nor do they have the funds to commit 
to such a project. 
User concern. Concern about security among users has 
grown. This concern is a function of reported security 
breaches rather than any planned changes in company security 
policy. 
The need for security has generally been discounted 
with the explanation, "It can't happen to us." But as fire, 
flood, theft, or fraud hit neighboring computer facilities, 
management becomes more concerned about security in their 
own operations. In the past, concern would ebb until an¬ 
other catastrophe occurred. 
Many recent events including the well publicized events 
at Equity Funding Corporation and Union Dime Savings Bank, 
have prevented the concern from ebbing as it has previously 
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done. Because of this publicity, management and auditors 
are becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility 
of such events occurring in their organizations. In addi¬ 
tion, state and federal governments have been threatening 
to pass tough privacy legislation which will require more 
interest in security as well as privacy. 
Perhaps, however, for the user the greatest source of 
information about security has been the trade journals. 
Their publications have, over the past few years, con¬ 
tained numerous articles about security and how to handle 
security problems. 
In May, 1970, in Datamation, William Bates published 
an article designed to acquaint business and data proces¬ 
sing managers with areas of vulnerability of information 
systems and to present a security system framework upon 
which an organization may build and develop to suit its 
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individual needs. Finally, he concluded by saying, "Al¬ 
though I have uncovered no hard evidence that there is v;ide- 
spread management interest in the problem of information 
system's security, there does appear to be a growing aware¬ 
ness in some organization's management that information 
system security is a critical area which requires personal 
concern." 
Frequently, Computerworid publishes articles discussing 
security breaches, industry reports, and expected legisla¬ 
tion. Also, nearly all monthly trade journals have two or 
0 
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three articles on the subject in the course of each year. 
Modem Data, in July, 1974, published a computer se- 
12 3 
curity survey. Questionnaires were mailed to a random 
sample of 2,000 EDP managers. Nearly half were dissatis¬ 
fied with senior management's awareness of the need for 
computer security, but 77% could not estimate the cost of 
a computer disruption. If EDP managers are genuinely con¬ 
cerned with security issues, they need to be able to show 
senior management cost figures to justify increased aware¬ 
ness . 
Summary 
Computer security is very complex, but includes the 
mundane issues like physical security and the extremely 
complex and interesting issues like privacy transformations 
and authorization procedures. Adding complexity is the 
fact that the complete set of threats and the complete set 
of countermeasures are difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine. Secondly, security remains a very individual¬ 
ized problem. Each user has different security requirements 
which necessitates that security plans be individually con¬ 
structed. It is impossible to construct a security frame¬ 
work which would be adequate for large numbers of users. 
Finally, interest in security issues is growing at a 
rapid rate. The vulnerability of the computer system and 
the data entrusted to it is now becoming an issue that data 
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processing managers can no longer avoid. The goal of de¬ 
veloping a secure system is being pursued by vendors, users, 
and academicians alike. 
Unfortunately, all of the countermeasures attempt to 
attack a problem which few people totally understand. Se¬ 
curity is only an issue if there is something that requires 
protection. Too frequently there is a lack of understanding 
about the value of the computer system or its data to the 
organization. A comprehensive security plan can only be de¬ 
veloped when the security needs of the user are clearly de¬ 
fined. 
Little research has been done on determining the secur¬ 
ity needs of the user. Before the security plan can be de¬ 
veloped we must determine what requires protection and the 
extent of the protection required. This can only be ac¬ 
complished by clearly understanding how the computer is 
used and the effect that various threats can have on the 
operation of the organization. 
In the next chapter a general framework will be pre¬ 
sented for developing a security plan. This framework will 
allow users to understand where they are going before at¬ 
tempting to get there. Without this understanding computer 
users are much like Alice when the cat told her that it made 
little difference which path she took if she didn't know 
where she wanted to go. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEVELOPING A SECURITY PLAN FOR 
A DATA BASE ENVIRONMENT 
A Contemporary View of Data Base Design 
Data organization. Data in a data base system is organ¬ 
ized quite differently from that found in a traditional en¬ 
vironment. In the past, data have always been organized into 
files created for use by a particular user department. How¬ 
ever, data bases create large reservoirs of data that any 
user can access. 
File structures require that a great deal of time be 
spent in file creation, editing, updating, and sorting of 
the records in the file. In addition, much time is spent 
in listing files while little computing is actually done. 
VThen a new need is perceived by the organization, a 
new file is constructed to meet that need. Generally, new 
information need not be collected, but information from a 
variety of other files must be extracted and collected on 
the new file. This new file is subject to the same prob¬ 
lems of updating and editing as the other files. 
The data base concept is designed to eliminate the 
necessity of storing a data element more than once. Also, 
the use of data bases is meant to reduce the time spent in 
editing, updating, and sorting of information. In a data 
base, if an error in the data is found it need only be cor- 
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rected once rather than at many sources. Vfhen information 
requires updating, it need only be done once. Sorting is 
reduced by being able to access records on more than one 
key. 
Data bases can reduce the data maintenance time, and 
offer other benefits to the organization. For exaraple, man¬ 
agement can ask questions of the data base and receive re¬ 
sponses much quicker than they could before as less comipli- 
cated programs need to be v/ritten to generate these re¬ 
sponses. Also, in the traditional approach a request re¬ 
quiring the gathering of data from two or m.ore files might 
not be accomplished because of tim^e or financial constraints, 
but v;ith a data base the request can usually be responded to 
in a reasonable period of timie with far less effort by the 
programming staff. 
Employing a data base allows more flexibility in using 
the availcLble data and provides management with more useful 
information when they need it. Given their access to more 
up-to-date informiation, management will have more timely in¬ 
formation to make decisions with. 
Key characteristics. To integrate all data that previ¬ 
ously was sorted in separate files and to provide management 
with the ability to satisfy its information needs, the data 
base must display four key characteristics: 1) common data 
definition, 2) on-line access capability, 3) effective data 
administration, and 4) maintenance of security procedures.^ 
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CcrzDon data defiriticns are not always necessary in the 
traditicnal envircnnent. To one prograrnr.er "QUAKTITY-ON- 
EAKD" night nean scnething conpletely different than to an¬ 
other programer. In a data base situation, however, "QUAN- 
TirY-OK-EAND* will near, the sane thing to each prograirjner 
and its definition will be clearly established. 
2xQ-t all systems will have an on-line access capability, 
but those that don't will ha've sene other means of querying 
the data base. Often a query language is provided so that 
a user, cn-line or batch, will be able to ask questions of 
the data base with little or no interaction with the pro- 
gramer. For example, a user might ask the computer, 
through the query’ language, to print the names and address¬ 
es cf all employees who have an annual income of greater 
than $5G,C0C and are divorced. The number of possible ques- 
tiens is unlimited and the effort to produce the responses 
is far less than in a file structure. 
Unfortunately, data elements become outdated and must 
be eliminated. Others are often added. Existing data ele- 
nants require up«dating and editing. In the file environ- 
iKent, the file owner would initiate the requests to make 
these changes but such a change in a data base environment 
iLay effect many mere users. Therefore, effective data ad¬ 
ministration musu be accomplished so that the data base is 
used properly. The position of data base administrator 
has been established to control access to the data base 
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and authorize any changes to the data elements. 
Finally, security procedures must be maintained. Us“ 
ing a data base means that all data is in one place, which 
is analogous to putting all of your eggs in one basket. 
Destruction, or even modification, of that data base could 
temporarily put the firm out of business. Security pro¬ 
cedures in a data base environment are therefore vital to 
its effectiveness. 
Problems. In addition to data organization and the key 
characteristics of a data base, a number of other problems 
are encountered when instituting a data base. These in¬ 
clude the lack of trained personnel, creation of a need for 
larger memory banks, greater complexity of reruns, and the 
difficulty of getting total management commitment to the 
2 
project. 
As data bases have become more popular, the demand for 
programmers, systems analysts, and data base administrators 
has grown rapidly. Unfortunately for the data base users, 
the supply of talented people with data base experience is 
not as large as.the demand. Therefore, training has had to 
occur in-house with applications programmers re-trained so 
that they might handle the more difficult data structures 
found in data bases. 
To m.erge all of the corporation's files into one large 
data base does reduce redundancy. However, because the 
data base is used almost continuously, while a file might 
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have only been used by the system for a short period of 
tine, the memory requirements are necessarily larger. On¬ 
line storage is a requirement of data base design. 
No matter how well the system is designed, reruns 
will, at times, be required. Because the information with¬ 
in the data base is constant3.y changing, re-start check¬ 
points will have to be made frequently. Transaction logs 
must be maintained so that the data base can be regenerated 
should the system go down and the data base is destroyed or 
EQodified. Essentially, this is no different from any on¬ 
line re-run procedure. However, in a data base iTiore users 
are affected by a rerun and the types of transactions in 
the transaction log v;ill be more complex and more numerous. 
The creation of a data base requires a great deal of 
time and effort by the computer staff as well as some large 
cash expenditures vrhich require a great deal of managem.ent 
support. Management has been conditioned to provide more 
funds to obtain more reports. But a data base won’t pro¬ 
duce more reports and, in some instances, it inay produce 
fewer. Its value to management will, at first, be question¬ 
able. When the data base comes into existence its users 
will not be creative or experienced enough to use it to its 
fullest potential. Commitment will not only be difficult 
to get initially but it could be difficult to maintain once 
the data base is in existence. 
If one were to ask a group of data base users why they 
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instituted a data base, the majority would be likely to an¬ 
swer, "To get at data quicker." Data processing managers 
would probably respond, "To manage data more easily." When 
the pluses mentioned in the beginning of this chapter are 
weighed against the minuses just mentioned, it will usually 
show that a data base can satisfy the needs of both user and 
manager. 
Many of the problems mentioned above can be solved by em¬ 
ploying an effective security plan. That plan must be care¬ 
fully designed to satisfy a number of criteria and must con¬ 
sider the special problem.s unique to data base systems. In 
the next section of the chapter factors influencing the de¬ 
sign of the security plan will be presented. 
Developing a Data Base Security Model 
Design criteria. To design a satisfactory security plan, 
four design criteria must be met: 1) effectiveness, 2) economy, 
3 
3) simplicity, and 4) reliability. These criteria are neces¬ 
sary in any type of a security plan regardless if the plan is 
designed to protect a sophisticated computer system with vast 
amounts of data stored on-line or if the system is a small 
batch card system. 
To be effective the plan must not allow the data to be 
modified, destroyed, or disclosed either intentionally or 
accidentally as it goes into the computer, while it's stored 
in the computer, or as the data results come from the com¬ 
puter.^ An effective plan will monitor the operation of 
the computer system so that it can determine whenever any 
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of these unfortunate events occur. Simply stated, the com¬ 
puter output should be what was expected from the program. 
A plan that was effective in a traditional environment 
may not be effective in data base environment. In the tra¬ 
ditional setting each user had access only to his files, but 
in the data base his access must be controlled more closely 
so that he cannot access information that is not in his user 
domain. To monitor these activities transactions logs must 
be maintained and access controls instituted. 
Given that it is never possible to develop a security 
plan that offers 100% protection, it is necessary to include 
economy as one of the criteria. Security needs must be bal¬ 
anced with the funds available. As funds are always a 
scarce resource that must be shared with other demands of 
the computer system, economy becomes a very important cri¬ 
terion. 
In a data base environment a larger proportion of the 
funds available for the operation of the computer system 
must be allocated to security measures. Destruction of a 
file in a non-data base environment creates a certain amount 
of inconvenience to the department that the file belongs to, 
but in the data base environment destruction of a file might 
temporarily cut off information sources to all departments. 
V7hile economy is important, system designers m.ust realize 
that a large proportion of their resources must be committed 
to the protection of all the data eggs in the one computer 
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basket. 
When we speak of simplicity we mean operating simplici¬ 
ty. For example, if a user at a rem.ote terminal must input 
his social security number, his mother's birth date, today's 
date multiplied by three plus two, and a user code, he is 
quite liable not to use the system because of all the bar¬ 
riers that have been established. It must be remembered 
that the computer is designed to provide a service to its 
user and if we make that service difficult to obtain then 
users will be less likely to fully utilize the computer. 
Authorization codes are essential to an on-line data 
base operation, but to maintain simplicity and security, as 
well, access to the system's resources has to be controlled 
by a systems program rather than employing the "twenty 
5 
questions" approach. Graham's "rings of protection," 
6 7 
Hoffman's "formularies," or authorization tables are all 
adequate procedures for most systems. 
Simplicity must also extend to the operation of control 
procedures within the computer center, the tape library, the 
backup storage facility, and other operational centers. In 
the event that the control procedures are not simple to op¬ 
erate, employees can be expected to bypass control proce¬ 
dures. Without adequate control, security is a myth. 
As for reliability, it is quite evident that the secur¬ 
ity plan must work continually to be acceptable. The com¬ 
puter systemi will be of little value if the security plan is 
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unreliable. Catching some of the intruders some of the time 
should be unacceptable to security plan developers. 
Reliability of the security plan in a data base environ¬ 
ment is of particular importance. Failure to catch one in¬ 
truder could result in disastrous results for all users. In 
some instances, intrusions might prove to be untraceable 
although their effect would be felt for a long time. 
The relationship between these variables has not been 
adequately explored. However, it appears obvious that cer¬ 
tain tradeoffs must be made to obtain the optimal security 
plan for the particular institution. 
We might hypothesize some of these relationships to aid 
in understanding possible tradeoffs with security needs. 
Assume that a firm has determined a minimum reliability that 
they will accept from the security plan, REL^^^, Assume, 
also, that they have determined a minimum response time that 
they will accept from the system, Response time can 
be defined as the minimum time that they are willing to wait 
at a terminal or the turn around time in a batch environment 
or some combination of both. In this case, we are using re¬ 
sponse time as a proxy for simplicity. 
The tradeoffs between RES and REL are illustrated in 
Figure 3-1 along with five different cost curves. Note that 
the minimum cost that must be expended to obtain and 
PUL . is represented by C . which passes through both 
min ^ min 
RES . and . . In this example, Cj. is less than C, . 
min min ^ ' 5 l 
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FIGURE 3-1 
TRADEOFF BETWEEN RESPONSE TIME AND RELIABILITY 
At this same expenditure the firm could increase reliability 
to approximately 100% but must make a tradeoff with response 
time approaching infinity. A tradeoff in the opposite di¬ 
rection will reduce reliability and yield a very small re¬ 
sponse time but obviously never very close to zero. 
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The shapes of the cost curves are difficult to deter¬ 
mine, but their shape in any area other than the southeast 
quadrant is purely academic because the firm has established 
the three quadrants as being unfeasible by their selection 
of REL . and RES . . Tradeoff relationships must be hy- 
min min ^ ^ 
pothesized only in the southeast quadrant. Therefore, we 
can only consider tradeoffs when we are talking about secur¬ 
ity budgets in excess of C . . 
As funds are increased two other phenomena can be ex¬ 
pected to occur. First, the probability of detecting an in¬ 
trusion, either accidental or intentional, will increase. 
Secondly, it is reasonable to believe that intruders will 
be less likely to attempt an illegal intrusion should they 
believe that funds are being expended to stop their attack. 
In the first case, we suggest a relationship as pre¬ 
sented in Figure 3-2. Implications of this figure are that 
if the firm is willing to devote funds in excess of C . 
^ min 
then the probability of detection will increase. 
In the second case, we can hypothesize a relationship 
as expressed in Figure 3-3. This is less obvious than the 
first case and probably untestable. However, if it is 
valid, then it might cause the detection line to rise in 
the previous figure. 
100% 
PROBABILITY 
OF 
DETECTION 
COST 
FIGURE 3-2 
TRADEOFF BETVTEEN PROBABILITY 
OF DETECTION AND COST 
NUMBER 
OF 
ILLEGAL 
ATTEMPTS 
Cmin 
COST 
FIGURE 3-3 
EFFECT OF INCREASING EXPENDITURES 
ON THE NUMBER OF ILLEGAL ATTEMPTS 
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While the previous discussion is quite hypothetical and 
cannot, at this time, be shown to be true by measurable 
data, it does illustrate some of the difficulties in measur¬ 
ing tradeoffs in these criteria. Additional efforts must be 
made to explore these relationships because of their rela¬ 
tionships to security needs and the balance that must be 
drawn in satisfying these criteria and meeting the security 
needs of the user. 
Objective function. It could even be more difficult to 
develop an objective function for a security plan. However, 
some objective function must be established if the plan is 
to meet the users* security needs. A number of possible ob¬ 
jective functions can be suggested. 
First, we might suggest that the security plan be de¬ 
signed to maximize the total level of security. Employing 
this as a possible objective function presents a number of 
unanswerable questions dealing with measurement and the 
definition of the term "total level of security." It is 
difficult to determine when a specified level of security 
is met. Security cannot be measured in those terms. 
Often, the only way to measure security is after the fact 
then it is often found that the security needs cf the users 
were greater than the security level offered by the plan. 
A possible objective function could be the minimization 
of costs. However, if costs are minimized so is reliability 
and the probability of detection. Using cost minimization 
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as a possible objective function is, perhaps, the v/orst pos¬ 
sible choice because of its minimizing effects on the other 
variables. Rather than using it as an objective function, 
it should be used as an economic constraint in conjunction 
with another objective function. 
A third possible choice would be to minimize potential 
vulnerability to one user or one user group. In a data base 
environment this might be the most valuable. Often one user 
or group of users would be most affected by an intrusion into 
the data base. Other users are less influenced by problems 
with the data base and could function, at least temporarily, 
without the use of the computer which is something that the 
principle user could not do. It is frequently easy to de¬ 
termine who would be most affected and what vulnerabilities 
are most likely to occur to their data. 
A fourth possible objective function would be to mini¬ 
mize the threat of a particular vulnerability. This vulner¬ 
ability might be very likely to occur, or the cost to re¬ 
cover, even though it has a low probability of occurrence, 
might be enormously large. For example, in an airline reser¬ 
vations system if the system is down for a long period of 
time it would be impossible to make reservations, to cancel 
reservations, or to know who should be on which plane. It 
might be possible to develop a security plan which would re¬ 
duce the probability of this event occurring to near zero. 
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As regulatory agencies create more regulations about 
what you can and cannot do with records, the problems of 
security become more acute. It might, in fact, be neces¬ 
sary to establish an objective function which is defined 
based on some legal constraints. Credit reporting agencies 
and banking institutions are governed by laws which deter¬ 
mine what type of information can be dispersed and to whom 
it can be dispersed. The security plan will have to be de¬ 
signed to meet these requirements. 
It is not possible to develop one objective function 
that will satisfy all security plans. Each firm must es¬ 
tablish an objective function based on a careful analysis 
of the security needs of the users. This objective func¬ 
tion will provide some direction in the development of the 
security plan. Without a security objective function the 
firm V7ill never know when they have acquired the security 
that meets their needs. 
Value of information. One of the most valuable assets 
of many firms is never seen on the balance sheet. That 
asset is information. Because accountants are unwilling to 
include it on the balance sheet, it is often not adequately 
insured or afforded the other means of protection that 
would go into protecting a truck or a piece of office equip¬ 
ment. The value of this asset will have a great influence 
on the amount of security required by the users. 
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However, the value of the inforriation to the firm is 
often greater than the cost of many of the firm's assets. 
Khen a security plan is instituted that value must be de¬ 
termined but it is often neglected. VThen this occurs, 
worthless information is protected dearly and very valuable 
information is given little protection. 
To establish the value of information, three estima¬ 
tions must be made; 1) the value to a potential intruder, 
2) the value to the data base owner, and 3) the value to 
the data subjects if the information is personal informa- 
p 
tion. All three of these must be estimated to determine 
the degree of protection to be afforded the data base. 
In most instances, the data stored on the data base 
must have seme value to an intruder or he wouldn't bother 
to spend the resources required to obtain the data. It is 
quite often easy to estimate this value. Can the data be 
sold? Is it of value to a competitor? Could an employee 
alter records that might be personally beneficial to him or 
close associates? These and other similar questions must 
be locked at and answered fully to determine the value to 
a potential intruder. 
In seme cases, value bo an intruder cannot be measured 
in eccnomic terms. Ke are now in a period in which large 
numbers of the population have programming expertise. For 
seme of these people, it is a challenge bo break the secur¬ 
ity of the system just for the thrill. This is the most 
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dangerous intruder to protect against. It is difficult to 
determine who he is, why he*s doing it, or even, when he's 
doing it. 
The value of information to the data base owner can be 
estimated by determining the effect on the organization 
were the information lost or disclosed to another source. 
This can be accomplished by an estimation of the cost to 
reconstruct the data or an estimation of the potential lost 
business should a competitor have access to this informa¬ 
tion. Once this is done the owner of the data base will 
often find that the information is much more valuable than 
had been expected. It is at this point that the value of 
the security plan becomes evident. 
The value of the data to the data subjects must also 
be considered. When confidential data is present on the 
data base, disclosing the information or altering it incor¬ 
rectly might cause harm to the individual that cannot be 
measured in economic terms. In the event that data is not 
considered confidential, its release might also cause harm 
to the individual that might not have been considered. 
The owner of the data base is often merely a custodian 
of information required to meet some functional objective. 
As such, he might be legally liable for damages should the 
data on a subject be released. In addition to that legal 
liability, he may wish to consider any moral obligations 
that he has to protect the data entrusted to him. 
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Once that the value of all information has been esti¬ 
mated, then this information can be employed in creating the 
security plan. It is at this stage that certain priorities 
can be set based on the value of the information and the se¬ 
curity needs of the users. For instance, an ordering based 
on value could be established to determine which data to 
protect and how much protection to offer it. Also, the in¬ 
formation derived in this part of the study can be used to 
sell management on the need for an effective security plan. 
In any event, the value of the information stored on the 
data base must be determined. 
Costs of a security plan. Costs relating to the de¬ 
velopment and operation of a security plan can be broken 
down into four distinct classes: 1) initial planning and 
design, 2) initial investment in hardware and software, 3) 
recurring operation costs, and 4) decreases in functional 
9 
capability. 
To go through the procedures mentioned previously re¬ 
quires a great deal of effort and time. However, by ade¬ 
quately planning and designing a security plan to satisfy 
all of the firm's need, the firm stands to save a large 
amount of money in operating costs and future losses re¬ 
sulting from an inadequate security plan. 
The planning and design require that representatives 
of the functional areas have a great amount of input. 
Therefore, much of the planning and design costs result 
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from time given up by these people. In addition, large 
amounts of time and effort are required of analysts and 
programmers in this phase. 
It will quite often be necessary to expand large 
amounts of funds on investing in additional hardware and 
software for the security plan to be successful. For ex¬ 
ample, it might be necessary to acquire an additional tape 
drive to maintain a transaction log or another terminal to 
monitor security breaches. Other expenditures might in¬ 
clude hardware devices on terminals to prevent unauthorized 
access or environmental equipment within the computer facil¬ 
ity to minimize equipment failure owing to environmental 
problems. 
Increases in software costs result from necessary 
changes to be made to programs currently in operation. 
These changes might include additional control totals or 
different authorization procedures. In addition, the op¬ 
erating system might require upgrading to adequately handle 
the transaction logs and authorization procedures. In some 
instances, firms have found it necessary to upgrade from 
DCS to OS with its corresponding requirements of additional 
memory and other devices. 
Hardware considerations include the requirement for 
extra backup facilities. These include investments in off¬ 
site storage facilities which could include a vault. 
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A security plan will have associated with it certain 
recurring operating costs. Included are the operation of 
the backup storage facility, the regular backing up of the 
data base, and the purchase of tapes and disk packs to 
supply the facility. Additionally, regular testing of the 
plan will be required as well as a periodic review to de¬ 
termine additional requirements or the adequacy of the cur¬ 
rent plan. These require a committment of time and effort 
by members of the data processing staff. 
Finally, there will be some decrease in the functional 
capability of the system. Programs will operate slightly 
slower because of the increased use of authorization proce¬ 
dures and the maintenance of transaction logs. If encipher¬ 
ment techniques are employed they will add an overhead to 
the operation of the computer facility. These are the most 
difficult costs to measure and are receiving a great deal 
of research effort. 
Costs must be classified to determine the ultimate 
benefit of a security plan. Often some of the costs can be 
directly related to a particular benefit that will accrue 
from the plan to determine the true value of the particular 
security procedures suggested. However, in most cases the 
sum of all of the costs will have to be weighed against the 
sum of all of the benefits to be derived. 
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Summary 
A security plan for a data base environment is, because of 
the organization and use of the data base, different than 
in a traditional setting. In this chapter we have outlined 
the differences in data organization, the key characteris¬ 
tics of data bases, and have enumerated some of the problems 
with the use of data bases. 
Security plans, for traditional settings or data bases, 
must be developed with respect to certain design criteria. 
These criteria have been explained and a number of issues 
relating to their interdependence have been raised. All of 
the criteria must merge to produce a security plan which 
meets some objective function which has as constraints the 
value of the infonriation stored in the system and the costs 
of developing such a plan. The interaction of these vari¬ 
ables has been discussed. 
Little mention has been made of how user security needs 
fit into this large picture. In the next chapter we will 
review four alternatives for determining security needs in 
a typical university setting. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEFINING SECURITY NEEDS 
Introduction 
The site chosen for reviewing alternative methods of 
determining security needs was the University of Massachu¬ 
setts at Amherst. It was selected because they had, in 
early 1974 , committed themselves to a tV7o-year project to 
institute a data base environment, their proximity to the 
author, and their willingness to v;ork closely with the 
author. It might be pointed out that a willingness to v/ork 
with a researcher in matters of secuity is not often found 
due to the sensitivity of security problems. 
User environment. The University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst is the largest institution in the Massachusetts 
state college system with nearly 25,000 graduate and under¬ 
graduate students enrolled in 1974. In 1960, the University 
had fewer than 8,000 students. Because of the tripling of 
enrollments in less than a 15-year period, a great number of 
buildings v/ere constructed and the staff was greatly in¬ 
creased to provide the student body with the services that 
they demanded. 
The administrative responsibility for processing the 
records of the students has also increased at an even faster 
rate. As an example, the undergraduate Registrar processes 
over 100,000 grades each semester and the Admissions Office 
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reviews 20,000 to 25,000 applications each year. It is 
evident that a sophisticated computer system is required 
to assist in handling the Registrar's and Admissions' work¬ 
load as well as the other departments serving the stu¬ 
dents . 
Computer environment. Like many academic institutions, 
the University of Massachusetts has tv/o computing facili¬ 
ties. One is devoted exclusively to administrative func¬ 
tions while the other is used for research and educational 
purposes. The administrative computer facility is housed 
in the principal administration building, Whitmore, and in¬ 
cludes an IBM 370/145 and an IBM 360/30. 
The other computer system, is a Control Data CYBER 74 
and is housed in the Graduate Research Center. Security 
for research data is a very important issue which should 
not be overlooked. Destruction of this data can result in 
the loss of many hours or even years of research. Many of 
the security measures implemented in the administrative 
system are also applicable to research data. However, this 
study is being completed on the administrative computer 
facilities rather than the research computer facilities. 
The research and teaching facility will therefore not be 
discussed further herein. 
90 
Administrative computation. When the University first 
began to process administrative records with the computer 
in 1962, they were using an IBM 1401. Quickly, they grew 
into and out of an IBM 1460. An IBM 360/30 was installed 
in 1967 to replace the IBM 1450 and In 1969 the IBM 370/145 
was installed to be used as the principal computer to re¬ 
place an. IBM 360/40 in use for only one year. The IBM 360/ 
30 is still used for input and output operations and for the 
processing of some small applications. 
As the University started to employ data processing, 
each user controlled his own files. Application programs 
were written for the user employing his autonomous files. 
The situation looked much like Figure 4-1. 
Fortunately, it was quickly seen that many of the files 
contained duplicate information. Integrated files were then 
created for use by more than one user department. This sit¬ 
uation is pictured in Figure 4-2. 
At the current time high integration exists in the stu¬ 
dent records area. A master file, referred to as "stats," 
is structured as an on-line file and contains most of the 
student records for all existing students. Users can ac- 
ces, update, or create data records on the file based on 
permissions granted to the user departments through the com¬ 
puter programs that they are able to use. Certain programs 
are limited in use to terminals residing in certain physical 
locations. 
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R = APPLICATION 
PROGRAM FOR 
REGISTRAR 
B = APPLICATION 
PROGRAM FOR 
BURSAR 
Figure 4-1 
Computer Processing Employing Autonomous Files 
Figure 4-2 
Computer Processing Employing Integrated Files 
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When the data base is installed all functions using 
student data will use an integrated on-line data base as 
illustrated in Figure 4-3. Three types of users will ex¬ 
ist. First will be those with power to access records only. 
These users are represented in the bottom of Figure 4-3. 
They will be required to access the system through an in¬ 
quiry program which will determine their "need to know." 
The second group of users will access the data base 
directly. These are the principal user departments which 
are along the right and the left sides of Figure 4-3. 
Their powers to access, update, or create data records, as 
well as accessing and modifying computer programs, will be 
controlled by the data management system. 
Finally, ADP and the Data Base Administrator (DBA) 
constitute the third group. They are responsible for the 
operation of the student data base. ADP is responsible 
for the day-to-day physical operation of the data center 
while the DBA controls access to data elements in the data 
base, adds and deletes data elements, and has general re¬ 
sponsibility to maintain the correctness of the data base. 
As of Spring, 1975, the system operates under IBM's 
Disk Operating System with Virtual Storage (DOS/VS) with 
hopes of installing IBM's more sophisticated Operating 
System (OS) by the end of the summer of 1975. The first 
shift is primarily responsible for servicing 80 terminals 
throughout the campus that have varying levels of authority 
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to access and update data records stored on-line. No term¬ 
inal user has the ability to write or modify computer pro¬ 
grams from his terminal. Most production jobs are run on 
the second and third shifts. 
Over 1800 programs exist in the program library. Many 
of these are AUTOCODER programs written in the middle and 
late sixties which are S'cill being emulated on both computer 
systems. In addition, many programs have been patched sev¬ 
eral times to the point that program changes are often dif¬ 
ficult, if not impossible, to make. The use of emulated and 
patched programs is explained as being necessitated by the 
rapid increase in demand for computing services which has 
not been paralleled by sim.ilar increases in prograirming 
support. 
Until January 6, 1975, the computer center operated as 
an open shop with users being able to wander freely in and 
out. Since that time, users have been required to submit 
jobs to be run across a counter and to return to the same 
location to pick up their output. Only authorized person¬ 
nel are allov/ed into the computer center. This change occur- 
\ 
red as a result of management's general concern for tighter 
control rather than a particular problem within the computer 
center. 
The center is located on the first floor of the Whitmore 
Administration Building. Persons coming down one of the tv;o 
principal stairv/ays in the building, come upon large windows 
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which look into the center when they reach the first floor. 
On the second floor a set of windows allows people to look 
down on the center from the most travelled corridor in the 
building which is directly opposite the teller windows in 
the Bursar's Office. 
The physical location, with its large windows, makes 
the computer center more vulnerable to bombings and take¬ 
overs than a less visible computer center would be. In an 
academic setting, this should be considered as a serious 
security problem. 
Operations of the center are managed by the Adminis¬ 
trative Data Processing (ADP) manager. ADP has a staff of 
approximately 35. The manager reports to the Director of 
Computer Operations who also controls the operations of the 
Graduate Research computing center and reports to the 
Chancellor of the Amherst campus. 
Programming and systems development are handled by a 
staff of approximately 31 in Management Systems (MS). The 
Director of MS reports to the Director of Budgeting and 
Institutional Studies who, in turn, reports to the Presi¬ 
dent of the University. It is interesting to note that 
there is no common reporting point for ADP and MS until 
they reach the President's Office. 
In addition, the Users Advisory Committee, made up of 
representatives of the user groups on campus, meets regu¬ 
larly to review and make recommendations on the use and 
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operation of the two computer centers. This conimittee has 
recently been expanded to include representatives of the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School and the Universi¬ 
ty of Massachusetts at Boston. The reason for this action 
is that the Amlierst computing facilities, both research and 
administrative, will be increasing their services to these 
campuses. 
Due to large increases in user demands for services 
and great overlaps in information needs of the users, the 
Users Advisory Committee decided in early 1974 to institute 
a data base environment. It was decided that five data 
bases v/ould be established: 1) student, 2) personnel, 3) 
physical facilities, 4) course, and 5) finance. Management 
Systems was given two years in v/hich to plan and implement 
the project. It was further decided that the student data 
base should be the first to be implemented. 
Am.ong the responsibilities of MS during this period of 
time included: 1) the hiring of a data base administrator, 
2) reviewing available data base management systems, 3) de¬ 
termining additional security needs, and 4) installing OS 
and, perhaps, an IBM 370/158 to replace the 145. Planning 
for implementation required the employment of critical path 
analysis v/hich is being followed closely. 
Preliminary Investigation 
University data bases. As previously mentioned, the 
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data base system to be established will operate on five in¬ 
dividual data bases. As the data bases serve the same com¬ 
munity, there will be some variables which will link the 
data bases together. In addition, some of the elements in 
one data base might be highly dependent on each other. The 
relationship of the five data bases is shown in Figure 4-4. 
The attention of this study is focused on the first 
data base to be installed, the student data base. Informa¬ 
tion stored on this data base will include but will not be 
restricted to basic identification data, admissions data, 
housing data, billing data, and academic data. 
The course data base is used to establish the schedul¬ 
ing of students into the courses offered by the University. 
There is a direct relationship between these two data bases 
during the scheduling period. During this period the course 
data base will require accessing of various identification 
and academic data (from the student data base) for schedul¬ 
ing purposes. 
All personnel data will be stored on the personnel data 
base. As many students are employed through work-study pro¬ 
grams, the student data base has to be closely related to 
the personnel data base. Identification data as well as 
some academic data could be called from the student data 
base for use by the personnel data base. 
Physical facilities will contain information on the 
buildings and equipment on campus. It will be used to main- 
Directly Related 
Indirectly Related 
FIGURE 4-4 
University Data Bases 
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tain maintenance programs and to coordinate the purchase of 
supplies and equipment. The relationship between this data 
base and the student data base is very minor. 
Finally, the financial data base is, perhaps, the most 
inqjortant data base to the University in terms of security. 
All financial transactions will be processed through this 
data base. Trust funds or other funds controlled by the 
University could be misused if the computer v;ere used as a 
tool for stealing. The student data base is only marginally 
related to the financial data base via billing data. 
Although each of these data bases have its own unique 
security problems, many of the issues involved in one are 
applicable to another. Therefore, when a similar security 
problem is solved in one it might no longer be a problem for 
the others. Given this situation, many of the issues solved 
in the implementation of the student data base v/ill provide 
answers to similar situations in the implementation of the 
other data bases. 
Information system structure. An information system 
cannot be thought of as only hardware and data. It is made 
up of many other components. All of these components must 
work together if the information system is expected to func¬ 
tion properly. Control of these components is very impor¬ 
tant—even more so than in a traditional setting. An illus¬ 
tration shov/ing the various components of the data base in¬ 
formation system is shov/n in Figure 4-5. 
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First, the system is established to serve the informa¬ 
tion needs of some group which, in this case, is the Uni¬ 
versity community. But the University community only exists 
to satisfy the needs of the data subjects. As the data sub¬ 
jects demand more services from the University community, 
more information must be collected. 
The Users Advisory Committee is a supervisory group 
which can be thought of as the information controller. They 
act as an agent of the University community and are responsi 
ble for making sure that the information needs are met and 
that adequate control is maintained on the information. 
Within the information system are three other important 
parts. The collector is responsible for retrieving informa¬ 
tion from the data subjects. User departments use the in¬ 
formation collected by the collector to satisfy their func¬ 
tional objectives. In some instances, the collector and 
the user departments are one and the same. 
Acting as an agent of the user group is the data base 
administrator. It is his responsibility to gather the in¬ 
formation from the collector and deposit it in the data 
base. He must act on requests from user departments to 
access, update, or create data elements. 
Unfortunately, unauthorized users might want to access 
the data base. They can infiltrate the data in one of two 
v;ays. First, they can obtain data from a user department. 
This can be with the aid of the user department or through 
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some illegal means. Secondly, they can illegally retrieve 
information directly from the system by stealing a data 
tape, wiretapping or some other illegal infiltration. 
The security system must be designed to minimize the 
second type of data theft. However, the first type is less 
easily dealt with. It is necessary that the user depart¬ 
ments be made aware of the risk of data theft and that they 
institute actions in their departments to control security 
problems. 
Control philosophy. Control of information in the 
data base is different than that of the traditional environ¬ 
ment. Clearly, the user department was the creator and user 
of the data file. They were then classified as the file 
owner and were allowed to control access to the files. As 
a data base is the consolidation of the files, control 
must be different than if files are used independent of each 
other. 
The Users Advisory Committee (UAC) responds to the 
information needs of the University community. Therefore, 
they are responsible to the University community for the 
operation of the information system. If they allow the con¬ 
trol of the data base to pass to the user departments, then 
the user departments m.ust establish individual policies 
for controlling the data elements or must interpret policies 
handed down by the UAC. 
As one alternative the user department would interact 
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with the Data Base Administrator (DBA) and act as a channel 
for passing information back up to the UAC. Also, the user 
department would control the collection of the information 
for use in the data base. Note, also, that in this situa¬ 
tion there is more than one controller of data elements in 
the data base. 
A second alternative would be to have the Users Advisory 
Committee control the data base. When the Users Advisory 
Committee controls the data elements we would recommend that 
they should establish a set of policies and procedures based 
on the needs of the user departments to be administered by 
their agent, the DBA. Then control would be through just 
one source rather than many, as would be the case if the 
user departments controlled tlie data elements. 
Control of the data element should be exercised at the 
Users Advisory Comiaittee level rather than at the user de¬ 
partment level. The DBA should act as their agent with the 
following responsibilities: 
1. to carry out policies and procedures established 
by the UAC; 
2. to act on user request for new uses of the data; 
3. to arbitrate conflicts between users with re¬ 
spect to the use of the data base; and 
4. to monitor for security breaches and initiate 
corrective action. 
As an agent of the Users Advisory Committee, the Data 
Base Administrator will report when policies and procedures 
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are inadequate, user requests for data cannot be resolved, 
conflicts cannot be resolved, and security breaches are un¬ 
usual or not easily resolved. If control is in the hands 
of the user departments it is quite likely that many, if 
not most, of the problems that the DBA would handle could 
filter up to the UAC which would create much extra work for 
that committee. A.lso, under the suggested policy the user 
departments v/ould not have to deal with the time-consuming 
problems of creating and interpreting policies relating to 
use of the data or of doing any of the other tasks that the 
DBA could easily do for them. 
When control is solely in the hand of the user depart¬ 
ments, the possibility of security breaches is greatly in¬ 
creased. An unauthorized user could request information 
from various authorized users and, by taking advantage of 
the different ways in v/hich these users interpret the oper¬ 
ational policies, obtain some privileged information that 
he could not have received by going through the DBA. A 
situation similar to this could put the University in viola¬ 
tion of a federal law such as the privacy bill signed by 
President Ford on December 27, 1974. 
The fcllcv/ing guidelines could be instituted: 
1. The Data Base Administrator will act an an agent 
of the Users Advisory Cor^jrtittee and they v/ill 
have ultimate co.otrol over the use of the data 
elements. 
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2. The UAC will establish policies and proce¬ 
dures , based on the user department needs, 
for the DBA to use as guidelines in carry¬ 
ing out the assigned functions. 
3. All conflicts concerning the use of the data 
elements v/ill be arbitrated by the DBA with 
the user departments having the privilege to 
appeal to the U7i.C. 
4. The DBA will report periodically to the UAC 
with respect to new uses of the data elements, 
abandoned uses of the data elements, results 
of conflicts and pending conflicts, and other 
matters related to the effective operation 
of the data base. 
5. The UAC will review periodically the functions 
of the DBA to determine that their policies 
are being carried out and that the user de¬ 
partment needs are being satisfied. 
The suggested procedure would put the control of the 
data elements in the hands of the Users Advisory Committee 
who v/ould act based on the needs of the users. The user de¬ 
partments v/ould be freed from dealing with problems of ac¬ 
cess control to devote their entire energies to servicing 
the University. This is the only acceptable procedure that 
can be instituted to give the control necessary to properly 
operate the data base. 
Invisible intruders. It is assumed that user depart¬ 
ments mentioned in the previous section will make requests 
for information from the data base administrator indepen¬ 
dently of each other. His approval of those requests would 
be based on their "need to know." 
On occasion users could request information jointly 
from the data base administrator. Again he would act on the 
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basis of the users' "need to know." 
It is the responsibility of the user departments to 
control the flow of information after it arrives in their 
departments. They must act in a similar manner V7hen other 
users request information from them. In addition, print¬ 
outs , cards, tapes, and other forms of computer input/out¬ 
put must be controled by them in the same manner that they 
would control their own files. 
However, an intruder could use the good graces of two 
or more user departments and their respective access to 
information through the data base administrator to obtain 
information that he could not have otherwise accessed. 
Assume, for example, that the intruder wanted to ob¬ 
tain a listing of the names of all University employees and 
their annual pay but that this information is classified. 
If the intruder is employed by some other user department 
or is a respected member of the University community, he 
might have no trouble in obtaining this information. 
By making a legitimate request to User A (see Figure 
4-6) he might obtain a listing of employee names along with 
employee numbers. This could be a request that the user is 
quite willing to fulfill based on his perception of the in¬ 
truder's information needs. 
Without knowing about the information that User A gave 
to the intruder. User B receives a request for a listing of 
employee numbers and corresponding annual salaries from the 
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FIGURE 4-6 
Invisible Intruders 
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intruder. As User B believes that the intruder is v/ell 
within his rights to have this information, he supplies it 
without question. 
Now the intruder combines the two unimportant lists 
of data and has a list of extreme value. Neither user is 
aware of any wrongdoing and yet probably has no idea how 
the intruder got this information. 
It is difficult for at least two reasons to protect 
against this form of intrusion. First, employees are usu¬ 
ally willing to supply information to colleagues should 
they believe that the information will aid the colleagues 
in their work. Second, it is often difficult to predict 
when two sets of innocuous data can be coni^ined to produce 
sensitive information. For these reasons, few, if any, 
particular countermeasures are available to thwart these 
threats. 
Four methods of analysis. Now that the planned data 
base system at the University has been fully explained we 
will look at four methods for determining user security 
needs. These four alternatives are based on four assump¬ 
tions which follow. 
First, it is assumed that security needs are based on 
the effect that a security breach could have on a user de¬ 
partment. Further, it is assumed that representatives of 
the departments should be good estimators of those needs. 
Second, the actual structure of the data base and the 
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users' ability to access, update, or create data records 
are assumed to be the determining factors in the second 
alternative. This assumes that this information is easily 
collectable. 
Third, data element usage is assumed to be a determin¬ 
ing factor of security needs in the third situation. From 
this assumption we implicitly determine that the most fre¬ 
quently used data elements should be the most closely 
guarded. 
Finally, computer usage is assumed to be the determin¬ 
ing factor in the fourth situation. It is assumed that the 
more a user uses the system the more important his security 
needs are. 
From these four assumptions, four methods of determin¬ 
ing security needs are suggested. First, user interviews 
could be conducted to determine the effect of a security 
breach on the user departments. The second method could be 
to examine the structure of the data base by examining the 
users' ability to access, update, or create data records. 
A third method suggested by these assumptions, is to examine 
the frequency with which data elements are used. Finally, 
the last method exeimines the actual intensity with which 
each user uses the computer system. 
These four methods were selected because they suggest 
procedures in which data can be collected in a relatively 
simple manner for an orderly analysis of the determining 
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factors of security needs. Should all, or any one of them, 
prove to be significant in the definition of security needs, 
then an easily employed procedure for defining security 
needs will have been revealed. 
The First Method: User Interviews 
Because a computer system is developed to serve the in¬ 
formation needs of the users, it is not unlikely that we 
should expect them to have some idea about their own secur¬ 
ity needs. It is assumed that they could measure the effect 
of being without the system for any period of time and that 
tJiey could estimate the criticality of the computer opera¬ 
tion to their departments. 
The major users of the current system are expected to 
be the major users of the new data base. A list of those 
users was prepared by Management Systems along with the per¬ 
son most familiar with computer operations in that user de¬ 
partment. 
Thirteen user departments were identified of which ten 
were selected for extensive interviewing. Two of the three 
departments that were not interviewed. Public Safety and 
Telephone Information, were not interviewed because of their 
use of data elements in the data base and their inability to 
create or update records. The other, Stockbridge, controls 
very few records on the system and has functions identical 
to the Registrar. 
Ill 
Table 4-1 lists the ten departments that were inter¬ 
viewed. The purpose of each department and a description 
of its computer usage appears in Appendix A. Also, for 
those departments that were interviewed, the people par¬ 
ticipating in the interviews are listed. 
Interview process. In eight of the ten interviews the 
primary objective was the same: to find out more about how 
the user department used the computer in its operations and 
to ascertain how various security breaches would affect 
those operations. Interviews at Administrative Data Pro¬ 
cessing (ADP) and the Provost's Office did not have the 
same purpose. 
Table 4-1 
User Departments'Interviewed 
Registrar 
Bursar 
Financial Aid 
Graduate School 
Provost's Office 
Housing 
Scheduling 
Administrative Data Processing (ADP) 
Institutional Studies 
Admissions 
The interview at ADP was designed to determine what 
security measures were currently in existence and to de¬ 
termine if the other user departments had left any glaring 
holes in their obvious security needs. Similarly, the 
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Provost's Office; where most users report, was interviewed 
to determine if the user departments over-emphasized their 
needs and to put all of the interviev/s into proper perspec¬ 
tive . 
All of the interviews, including those at ADP and the 
Provost's Office, were open ended. A series of questions 
was prepared before the interview but responses to those 
questions often resulted in other questions being asked. 
In most departments only one interview took place, but in 
the Registrar's Office and ADP two interviews were necessary. 
Interviewees were asked to estimate the effect on their 
departments were various pieces of data disclosed, modified, 
or destroyed. They did this for normal operating periods 
and for peak operating periods. This information was later 
used in the development of consequence estimates which v/ill 
be discussed later. 
They v/ere also asked questions relating to the frequen¬ 
cy with which they use the computer system, the form of ac¬ 
cess that they used, their dependence on data supplied by 
other parties, operational controls in their own department, 
and various other questions. These are all non-quantifiable 
responses which must be ascertained to get a good feel of 
user security needs. 
Consequence estimates. Based on the user interviev/s 
consequence estimates were prepared. These estimates appear 
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in Table 4-2. 
Users were asked to estimate the effect of not hav¬ 
ing access to the computer would have on the operation of 
their departments. They also estimated how long the system 
could be "down" before serious operational problems v/ould 
develop in their departments. These estimates were made 
for both peak and non-peak periods. 
/ 
During non-peak operating periods two users could get 
along without computing services for as long as one month. 
Scheduling could put off most of their computer work until 
the computer was "up" again. Housing makes infrequent in¬ 
quiries during this period which could also wait. 
Other users were able to do without the system for one 
to two weeks with the exception of the Registrar who re¬ 
quired that the system be brought "up" within one day. 
Their processing is quite heavy throughout the year and a 
system failure that extended for any length of time would 
greatly affect their operation. 
Even during non-peak periods system failures have som.e 
operational effect on users. The Registrar, Admissions, and 
the Graduate School would all experience moderate inconven¬ 
iences v/hile the other departments would be expected to ex¬ 
perience only a low level of inconvenience. 
During peak operating periods the effect of the system 
being *'do‘//n" is, as expected, greatly increased. Even dur¬ 
ing these periods Admissions, Scheduling, and Institutional 
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Studies can be without the system for a period of up to one 
week. Most other users are crippled after one day but the 
Registrar can only be without the system for thirty minutes. 
In all but three cases the operational effect is high 
during peak periods. Financial Aid would experience a moder- 
ate effect and Scheduling and Institutional Studies both can 
be rated as low. 
As previously mentioned, this table was prepared from 
user interviews. If however, the responses to questions 
asked in each interview, without respect to some relative 
relationship of the users, all users would rate their own 
inconvenience as high. The interview that was held with 
the Provost's Office enabled the researcher to put the re¬ 
sponses into proper perspective and understand better the 
effect that such a failure would have on each user depart¬ 
ment . 
It is clear from this table that the operation of the 
Registrar's Office is critical during both peak and non-peak 
periods. Even if a failure occurs during a non-peak period 
for the Registrar that happens to be a peak period for some 
of the other users, the consequences of such a problem to 
them is at least as important as to the other users. Impli¬ 
cations of this analysis are that a security plan must be de¬ 
veloped which v/ill consider the Registrar as the most affec¬ 
ted user during all periods. 
Peak usage periods. Table 4-3 illustrates the periods 
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Table 4-3 
Perceived Peak Usage Periods 
Registrar 
Admissions 
Graduate School 
Bursar 
Housing 
Financial Aid 
Scheduling 
Institutional 
Studies 
J F M A M J J 
XX X 
X X 
A S O N D 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
X 
XX XX 
X 
X X X X X X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
defined by the users as peak usage periods during the inter¬ 
views. These periods are important to the users because of 
the severe operating effect that would result should the sys 
tern be down during these periods. 
It is important to note that this table was developed 
from perceptions rather than any figures on business activ¬ 
ity in their departments. While perceptions are not alvzays 
accurate, they were drawn from individuals most familiar 
with operations in their department. In lieu of business 
activity statistics, they should represent the most reliable 
information source. 
From this table we note that six of eight users identi¬ 
fy September as a peak period. Also, five users choose Jan¬ 
uary. No users find March and November to be peak usage 
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periods and April and August were only selected by one user 
which happens to be the same user. 
Clearly, some months are much more important in terms 
of the computer's effect on the operation of the University. 
This table illustrates the user's perceptions of those 
periods. 
A user's perception of his information needs could have 
some bearing on his security needs. The interviews, how¬ 
ever, did not shed much light on the relation of information 
needs to security needs. 
Users v/ere unwilling or unable to conceive of many of 
the possible security breaches that were discussed. As a 
group, they were willing to abdicate this concern to ADP and 
MS if, in fact, they thought it to be a concern. No user 
had even given consideration to a contingency disaster plan. 
Little concern was given to the possible modification or 
disclosure of data. 
The interview process is important because of its value 
in learning hov/ the user departments use the computer. This 
first nethod also provided information relating to the peak 
usage periods and the consequences of system failures. 
Insights established from this process are not as val¬ 
uable to defining security needs in the selected setting as 
we would have liked to have seen. It is not possible to 
conclude that any general framework for the establishment 
of security needs can be established from this interview 
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process. 
One can conclude, however, that awareness of security 
probleras is lacking. Perhaps if the users were more aware 
of security problems and the implications for the operation 
of their own departments, then the interview process would 
be more beneficial. It must be concluded, given the test 
case, that the interview process is of marginal value in 
defining security needs. 
The Second Method: Data Base Structure 
One assumption that might be used is that a security 
system must be developed to protect the data elements from 
outside attack. Under this plan it is assumed that user 
needs will be satisfied should the data elements be pro¬ 
tected adequately. 
Data categories. The basic unit of information on a 
data base is the data element. A security plan must be de¬ 
signed to protect those data elements if the data base is 
to be an asset to the organization. Without protection of 
the data elements the data base becomes a liability. 
To offer this protection, the data elements that will 
appear in the data base must be identified. In attempting 
to accomplish this task for the student data base, all pos¬ 
sible data elements that are expected to be included were 
listed. This v/as done realizing that some elements might 
be deleted and others added before the data base is insti- 
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tuted. While this selection procedure might be considered 
a limitation, its effect will be minor given the extensive 
list that was generated and the fact that no user was able 
to suggest additional data elements. 
The data elements that will be included in the data 
base fall into ten data categories. These are listed in 
Table 4-4. Note that each category is fairly self-explana¬ 
tory and offers a fair prediction of the data elements that 
might appear in each. 
Table 4-4 
Data Categories 
I Basic Classification and Identification Data 
II Parent/Guardian and Permanent Name and Address Data 
III Enrollment and Withdrawal Data 
IV Local (on campus) Residence Information--Current 
V Local (on campus) Residence Information--Future 
VI Miscellaneous Billing Data 
VII Academic Data 
VIII Admissions Data 
IX Miscellaneous Processing Data 
X Fees 
Under each category the data elements that were expected 
to be used v/erc listed and assigned an identification number. 
When completed this listing of data elements should be iden¬ 
tical to the data base’s data element dictionary. 
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The listing that was prepared resulted from working 
closely with a staff member of Management Systems who was, 
at the same time, preparing the data element dictionary. 
From him, two primary sources provided most of the data 
element list. An MS publication of September 15, 1972, en¬ 
titled Student Data Elements Dictionary contained a listing 
of all data items then used on tape and disk files. The 
National Center for Higher Education Management Systems at 
the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education 
(WICHE) published Data Element Dictionary: Student in 1972. 
The WICHE report along v/ith interviews with MS staff mem¬ 
bers, suplemented the list prepared from the MS publication. 
As the WICHE report is a standard listing of all data 
elements in a typical student records system, and because it 
is employed by many universities, this second method can be 
generalized to any student records system in a university. 
Thus, not only the procedure employed here but the data ele¬ 
ments listed as well, are easily generalized even though 
they were selected for this specific case. 
In addition to data elements that are used extensively 
by the users, a number of elements fall into a category of 
processing items for each user department. These data ele¬ 
ments might be required by the system for various processing 
functions or they could be elements that are created or up¬ 
dated automtatically by the system based on some action taken 
by the user department. Fourteen categories were defined 
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for these data elements and are listed in Table 4-5. As 
these elements are maintained by the computer, they do not 
appear in the data element lists that follow. 
Table 4-5 
Processing Items 
201 Admissions 
202 Stats 
203 Systems 
204 Boston 
205 Bursar 
206 Registrar 
207 Housing 
208 Continuing Education 
209 Financial Aid 
210 Scheduling 
211 Graduate School 
212 Personnel 
213 Stockbridge 
999 Miscellaneous 
Data element-creators. Once the data element 
list was prepared it was necessary to determine which users 
were the creators of v/hich data elements. MS staff members 
aided in the preparation of this material which was later 
verified in user interviews. A complete list of data ele¬ 
ments and the creators of those data elements appear in 
Appendix B. 
An "X" appears under each user that has the power to 
create that particular data element. A number of elements 
have more than one entry. To understand this phenomenon 
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the admissions process must be explored. 
When a student applies for admission to the University 
his records are processed through the Admissions Office. 
They establish a record for the student in an admissions 
file which contains admission information as well as much 
of the information in Data Categories I, II, and III. When 
that student is admitted his record is "rolled-over" to the 
"stats" file. 
Based on this, the Admissions Office is the principal 
creator of most of the student data records. In some cases, 
students transfer in, re-enter the University, or for some 
other reason are not processed by the Admissions Office. 
In those instances, the Registrar creates the record in the 
"stats" file. It is estimated that less than 5% of all 
records are created in this manner. 
The Graduate School is listed as the creator of some 
data elements. They act as both an Admissions Office and 
the Registrar for all graduate students. Because of this 
dual function, all graduate records on the "stats" file are 
initiated in the Graduate School. 
Finally, some data elements don't have any creator 
listed. These elements are processing elements that are 
created by the system and not a user department. Some of 
these, such as "number of credits passed," are updated by 
the system at predictable intervals. Of the 123 data ele¬ 
ments listed, 18 fall into this category. 
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Data element-accessors. Appendix C identifies those 
users who are allowed to access data elements in the data 
base. Access is defined as having permission to display 
that data element on a Cathode Ray Tube (CRT), print the 
data element out on a terminal, or to print it out in some 
batch reporting system. 
Primary access is assumed which says that the operat¬ 
ing system makes the decision to grant or deny access based 
on some predefined rules or schemes. The security system 
cannot be designed to control secondary access which is when 
information is passed from one user to another. 
The appendix was prepared as a result of discussions 
with MS staff. Its contents were verified in user interviews. 
This access matrix represents the lowest level data usage. 
Data element-updaters. Appendix D identifies the 
users that are allowed to update data elements on the data 
base. These users are allowed to make changes in each data 
element and, therefore, must also be allowed access to the 
data elements. Having authority to update records can be 
thought of as a second level of security which is below 
creation and above accessing of data elements. 
Again, this appendix was prepared as the result of dis¬ 
cussions with MS staff and then verified in user interviews. 
Each time that a "1" is entered it implies that that user 
has authority to update that data element. 
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Both the access matrix and update matrix can be used 
as authority matrices in the development of the security 
plan. Then when a request is made to access or update a 
data element the user's authority is verified in the appro¬ 
priate matrix. 
If authority is granted based on the information in¬ 
cluded in the matrix then it is of vital importance that 
the contents of the matrices are correct. There are two 
ways in which this can be accomplished. First, all data 
elements can be identified as data elements that the user 
should not have authority to access or update and will be 
labeled as such. It is assumed that all other data elements 
are within his authority structure. 
A second method says that you start with the assumption 
that no one can access or update anything. From that start¬ 
ing point, you grant priviledges to users when you determine 
that they have a "need to know." 
While the first method is the most popular it is also 
the least effective means of access control. Should an 
error occur when using the first mehtod, it is likely that 
access will be given to a user that shouldn't have access. 
In that case, it is also likely that this information will 
never become known because you have given him more than he 
needs to function but have not limited his information. 
In the second case, an error is liable to mean that 
access has not been granted to someone who should have 
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access. Now information will be denied the user when he 
should have had access to it. It is a safe bet that the 
user will make this fact known while in the former situa¬ 
tion that bet is not as safe. 
The establishment of the data elements, their creators, 
updaters, and accessors is a worthwhile task for the reasons 
stated above. This information can then be used in author¬ 
ity matrices. However, little can be concluded about gen- 
eral security needs from this method of analysis. 
It can be concluded that this is a necessary and suffi¬ 
cient procedure if we are to adequately protect all data 
elements from those who do not have authority to create, up¬ 
date, or access data elements. Conclusions relating to the 
consequences of various security breaches cannot be drawn 
from this method of analysis. Therefore, this method cannot 
be employed to totally define security needs but must be used 
in conjunction with other procedures for the establishment 
of a computer security package. 
The Third Method: Data Element Usage 
The underlying assumption in this part of the study is 
that users' security needs are a function of the frequency 
v/ith which a particular data element is used. In other 
v/crds, if a data element is used quite frequently by many 
user programs then destruction or modification of that data 
element could result in serious operational consequences to 
each of the users. 
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When a data base system is installed each data element 
is assigned a name that will be used by programmers when 
they write programs using the data base. In a non-data base 
environment common data names do not often exist. 
To standardize data name usage in COBOL programs, MS 
established a COBOL data name directory. This directory 
lists each COBOL data name followed by the name of the pro¬ 
gram or programs that the COBOL data name appears in. It is 
e*xpected that when a programmer writes a program that he 
will use the data names in this directory. Because COBOL 
has been the principal language used over the last several 
years, virtually all of the data elements maintained in 
files by the University appear in this directory. 
As these data names will represent the starting point 
for the creation of the student data base it was felt that 
they could be used to analyze some of the information uses 
of the user departments. This analysis would be used in 
better understanding the security needs of the users. 
Initially, MS provided a box of Hollerith cards which 
contained that subset of the COBOL data name directory which 
referenced student information. All of these names had 
identifying prefixes of "SU-" which were discarded. This 
information was then loaded onto a file for further proces¬ 
sing . 
Based on the data element numbers that had been pre¬ 
viously assigned, each entry was given a number. A total 
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of 105 different data element names appear. This is some¬ 
what lower than the 137 data elements that appear in Table 
4-5 and Appendix B. Accounting for this discrepancy are 
two things. First, many data elements that are expected 
to be instituted in the new data base would not appear in 
the COBOL data name directory. Secondly, many of the ex¬ 
isting programs were written in the older IBM programming 
language, AUTOCODER, so the data names would not appear in 
« 
the COBOL directory. 
Rank order usage. Appendix E is a listing of the fre¬ 
quency of occurrence of each data element in data element 
order. Thus, student number, which is data element #1, 
appears in 115 COBOL programs. 
From this appendix. Appendix F was prepared which lists 
the frequency of occurrence of each data element in rank 
order of occurrence. Permanent address of the student's 
parent or guardian, which is data element #20, occurs in 
209 programs. 
Most frequently used. Because of the manner in which 
program names are assigned it is often easy to determine 
from the name what user department the program is used by. 
Eleven of the most frequently occurring departments were 
selected to be used in breaking down the manner in which 
the data elements were used. 
Many of the department names are obvious from the past 
discussions but those that are not will be discussed. Ac- 
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counting handles the financial records of the University 
and works closely with the Bursar's Office. They require 
information about students for payments to trust funds, 
payments of dormitory bonds based on where the students 
reside, and many other bits of information. 
Payroll requires access to student information for 
paying students who are working on campus. Note that the 
most frequently used items by them are the student's school 
address, the student name, and the student number. 
Grades can be thought of as a subset of the Registrar's 
operation. An entire series of programs has been written 
which handle the grading process for the Registrar. 
Entries under "Boston" indicate the usage of data ele¬ 
ments in computer programs which have been written for 
special use by the University of Massachusetts-Boston campus. 
As ADP handles more of the computer work for Boston this 
list can be expected to grow. 
The Registrar has two entries. The first entry applies 
to batch programs and the second entry applies to programs 
which are used on teleprocessing. This is the only depart¬ 
ment that can be broken down into these two categories. 
As previously mentioned, "stats" is the primary data 
file for active student records. Many user departments have 
access to the "stats" file and there is no convenient way in 
which to isolate the accesses made by each department. 
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Finally, any reference that does not conveniently fall 
into any one of these categories was deposited in the mis¬ 
cellaneous group. Any number of user departments could 
have fallen into this area including Alumni Records, Per¬ 
sonnel, and others. 
Table 4-6 displays the 25 most frequently called for 
data names and identifies the number of times that each de¬ 
partment uses the name. With 25 of 105 data names displayed 
we have only 23.8% of all data names but they account for 
70.4% of all data name occurrences in the currently used 
COBOL programs. 
It is this set of data that must be protected at a 
more secure level than the rest of the data base. Not only 
is it the most frequently used, but it is also the most in¬ 
terdependent. Therefore, when data element #20 is lost, 
each of the users suffers a loss. The situation is not 
quite as severe at the bottom of this list. 
So, the three methods of analysis discussed, activity 
rank order is the most valuable. By offering protection to 
less than 24% of the data elements in this case we can pro¬ 
tect over 70% of the data used by the programs currently 
running on the system. 
No conclusions should be drawn about the relative im¬ 
portance of these data elements to a particular user depart¬ 
ment other than defining the number of times that a particu¬ 
lar data element appears in programs written for that de- 
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partment. Clearly, some data element which is infrequently 
used might be critical to the department's operation. 
By having cross tabulations on which departments use 
which data elements, policies can be established for recov¬ 
ery should a particular data element be destroyed or modi¬ 
fied. For this reason alone, a clear understanding of the 
interdependence of these data elements is important. This 
third method of analysis adequately provides this informa¬ 
tion. 
The Fourth Method: System Usage 
i 
Finally, we can make an assumption about how the com¬ 
puter system is utilized. This assumption says that a se¬ 
curity plan must be developed which offers maximum protec¬ 
tion when the system is most heavily used. Further, it might 
be possible to determine when users are using it and to 
give them added protection during their heavy usage periods. 
It is fair to assume that the effect of a security 
breach will be greater when the system is heavily utilized. 
It is also fair to assume that users do not have identical 
periods in which they maximize their use of the system. This 
assumption has already been shown to be a fact. Based on 
this assumption, monthly accesses to the system were anal¬ 
yzed. 
Monthly accesses. The University's operating system 
collects various teleprocessing statistics which might aid 
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in determining user security needs. Included is the number 
cf accesses that each user made to the system each month. 
This identifies that a user accessed information but it 
does not tell us which data elements were accessed or which 
program was employed. In the event that a person makes a 
change to a data element, that event is not recorded in 
these statistics. 
Table 4-7 lists the number of accesses per month in 
1974 for each of eleven different users, total accesses that 
each user made in 1974, and the total accesses to the system 
for each of these months. Data for 19 74 were selected because 
theyrepresents the year in which teleprocessing was used most 
significantly by the University and, as such, it is believed 
that it is more representative of future computer utiliza¬ 
tion than previous years. Also, it is expected that users 
will satisfy more of their information needs with telepro¬ 
cessing when the data base is instituted than with batch 
processing. 
Two abnormalities are quite clear in looking at the 
raw data. First, Public Safety has virtually no entries 
for the first four months of the year. This is explained 
by the fact that they were having their teleprocessing termi¬ 
nals installed during that period which is a phenomenon 
that can be expected to occur each year as new users are 
put onto the system. 
I 
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Secondly, the data for March are exceedingly low. As 
no users perceive March as a peak usage month (see Table 
4-3) this was initially thought to be the reason. After 
investigating it was found that virtual storage was being 
installed during March and that March was chosen for the 
installation as it was a non-peak period. During the in¬ 
stallation the system was frequently down. 
It must also be remembered that most of these statis¬ 
tics were gathered on the first shift. The second and 
third shifts are used to process batch jobs. Noting that, 
we find that an average of 6752 accesses are made per day 
given a 22 work day month and that during September, the 
peak month, that number reached 9775. Theoretically if 
the system is down for one day in September the amount of 
work that is backed up is one-half greater than on average. 
When the system is revived, it must not only complete a 
workload that is one-half greater than normal but must play 
catch up by being a day and a half behind as well. 
In February, the least used month other than March, 
average daily accessing totals 4477 inquiries. This repre¬ 
sents only 66% of an average day's operation. When the sys¬ 
tem is down for a day in February the situation is far less 
critical than in other periods. Recovery can occur quite 
easily as two days' work will not even be as great as one 
day's work during September. 
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Policy implications that can be drawn from this analysis 
are quite clear. Security needs are not constant over time. 
Certain periods of the year exist in which the demands on the 
system are twice as heavy as during other periods. It is 
during these periods that security should be the tightest. 
Recovery from a security breach can be more difficult during 
this period. 
Looking at this exhibit along rows rather than columns 
we find another source of information. Users do not all use 
the system equally. The largest user, the Registrar, ac¬ 
cesses the system 127 times more than the smallest user. In¬ 
stitutional Studies. The Registrar also accesses the system 
2.5 times more than the second largest user, the Telephone 
Operators. In only one month, Septemiber, does the Registrar 
rank second in terms of computer usage. 
While each user has his own unique problems, the Regis¬ 
trar is most dependent on the computer for his information 
needs. A shutdown of the computer could have a devastating 
effect on the operation of the Registrar's Office. 
Percentage of monthly usage. From Table 4-7 it was pos¬ 
sible to develop Table 4-8. This table shows the ratio of 
accesses made each month to the total number of accesses made 
by the user in the course of the year. If their access rate 
was constant then each block in the table would equal 8.33%. 
This table allows us to get a feel for the actual peak 
periods rather than the perceived peak periods. It also 
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illustrates unusual changes in demand. 
For instance, the telephone operators access the system 
most frequently in September. During September demand is 
nearly three times as great as average demand. Demand de¬ 
creases slowly throughout the year from September on until 
very little usage of the system is made during June, July, 
and August. The usage pattern can be explained by noting 
that at the beginning of an academic year students do not 
know the telephone numbers of their friends but as the year 
goes on they learn their friends numbers and are less depen¬ 
dent on the telephone information service. Unlike other de¬ 
partments, should the system be down, access from the tele¬ 
phone operators will not back up. Students will obtain the 
information elsewhere rather than wait for the system to 
recover. Other usage patterns can be reviewed in much the 
same manner. 
Percentage of annual usage. Table 4-9 was also de¬ 
veloped from Table 4-7. Included in the body of the table 
is the percentage of the total month's usage that the user 
made each month. On the bottom of the table is the per¬ 
centage of annual usage that all users made of the system 
that month. 
This table, along with Table 4-8, provided the informa¬ 
tion to create Tables 4-10 and 4-11. Table 4-10 is a rank¬ 
ing of the number of accesses made each month while Table 
U
se
r 
D
e
p
a
rt
m
e
n
ts
 
T
e
le
p
ro
c
e
s
s
in
g
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
e
s
 
A
s 
A
 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
o
f 
T
o
ta
l 
M
o
n
th
ly
 
U
se
 
f
o
r
 
1
9
7
4
 
138 
<r rvj VO VO 0\ fM O O 00 
o CN CM fH 00 <r VO o O 00 r-l CO 00 
u • • • • • « • • • • • • 
a VO ,4n r^ o r-C CO Ov cn c^ 
/ 
CO rH r-C 
00 00 VO ITi 'cr <r m 00 
> Ov o 00 <r CM Ov lO CO C'. <r 
o • • • • • • • • • • • • 
SO rH o O O o CM CM cn o 
CM rH 
CM ov VO VO Ov cn 00 CM CM in VO 
H 1^ o OS 'O’ Ov '3- VO 00 o CO -cr VO 
O « • • • • • • • « • • • 
O CO Ov r-C o rH O o CH <T Ov 
>3- CM 
rH 00 iH CM oo Os VO 00 <r VO 
PV| o VO CM o 00 <r in rH CJv O 
W « • % • • • • • • • • • 
CO CM 00 m CM o o CJv rH <r CM 
r-t CM CM rH 
o 
CO CM oo c^ r-C o CJv rH CM rH in 00 
CO VO VO CJV OV CO CJv C\ VO O VO <r 
• • • • • « • • • • • • • 
< <r CM o o o o o CO CM in 00 
r-l rH 'O- rH 
00 CJV Ov <r CO 00 in in c^ 00 CO 
l-J r-- <r m CM VO CM CM rH CM VO VO o 
• • • • • • • • • - • • • 
VO <r rH r-C O o OO CO r-C >3" o 
rH in rH 
rH VO o oo VO rH OV <M 00 VO CO <r 
VO 00 CJv in <r CJV rH CM OV 00 
• • • « « • • • « • • • 
00 CM <r o CO o o <T in CO -sT 00 
rH <r rH 
VO in CM CM CO 00 o VO o rH in 
CO CO ■ r-- rH CM VO f—c o in rH <r 
• • • • • • • * • • • « 
CM CJV CM VO i-H o o CO CO V£) Ov 
<r i-C rH 
CM <r CM VO rH CO CJV CM CO <r 00 
C^ c^ rH VO VO CM CM O o r- -a 
pvi • • • • • • « « « • • • 
< rH c^ rH OO o O O CM O o 
-a- f-H CM 
VO o rH in vO CJv Ov <r o CM CO 
o: rH CM rH CM o CO OO r- Ov o CM 00 
< • • 4 • • • • • • • • • 
s CM CM CM CM CO ■ o o CO CJV o CO rH 
rH <r CM 
OS CJV CO CO rH rH O O CJV CM 
cq in rH CO CO -a in rH rH o 00 in 
U • • • • • • • • • • • • 
(X4 CO rH CO OO CO o rH Os VO o CM in 
CM CM CM 
CM CM CM o CM c^ rH CJV o in 
00 VO VO o 00 CO CM rH CO o o\ 
< 4 * • • • • • • % • • • 
-) o VO CO CJV CM o O yO o o ov VO 
f—l -a rH 
.-:i \ 
O 
Q 
i-i 
O 
X 
< o u z w 
CO CJ o CO Cl4 
1-:) os Q t-l Ci3 M < 
< u < M H HH Z CO 
M H o K OS P <=> H 
pc: 
o 
CJ < 2: H PQ CO z c_> • 
t-H CO US M H o < p-l H-4 Ch 
< a CO M C_) H CO > CO u l-J • 
2: S 2> CJ o CO o . 
OS l-J CQ Q 
(-( o w H z pc; ts w ts • 
(Li o a: OS CO (H CO H PU < 
1 
139 
Table 4-10 
Monthly Accesses 
Month # of Accesses % of Total 
September 215,054 12.06 
November 186,697 10.48 
July 179,791 10.03 
October 172,473 9.67 
May 168,474 9.45 
December 167,295 9.38 
June 157,622 8.84 
August 151,149 8.48 
April 133,373 7.48 
January 120,740 6.77 
February 98,497 5.52 
March 32,580 1.83 
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Table 4-11 
. 
User Accesses 
User Department # of Accesses % of Total 
Registrar 744,826 41.77 
Telephone 296,393 16.63 
Graduate School 225,655 12.66 
Bursar 187,326 10.51 
A.D.P. 88,810 4.98 
Financial Aid 78,481 4.40 
Housing 75,666 4.25 
Public Safety 35,280 1.98 
Stockbridge 31,919 1.79 
Provost 12,528 0.77 
Institutional Studies 5,863 0.33 
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4-11 is a rank order listing of the amount of usage that each 
user made during the year. 
Peak usage periods. Table 4-10 differs sharply from the 
perceived peak usage patterns exhibited in Table 4-3. In 
both cases September was determined to be the peak usage 
period and March to be one of the least used months but any 
similarities stop at that point. 
The users selected January as the second most important 
month but the teleprocessing statistics show it to be the 
tenth. Similarly, November was not selected by any to be a 
peak usage period but the teleprocessing statistics show it 
to be the second most important month. Similar inconsisten¬ 
cies apply to other months. 
Inconsistencies such as the above imply two things. 
First, users may not be able to accurately estimate the peak 
computer usage periods due to any number of factors of their 
definition of peak period could be different than that of the 
researcher. Secondly, an attempt to measure security needs 
on the basis of usage might be difficult unless the incon¬ 
sistencies in perceived peak periods can be explained. 
There is also the difficulty of comparing apples and 
oranges. In this case, we are comparing teleprocessing sta¬ 
tistics, which represents actual usage, against their percep¬ 
tions of peak usage periods employing the assumption that as 
the work-load rises or falls in the user's office his use 
of teleprocessing will rise and fall by a similar amount. 
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Based on user interviews and these teleprocessing statistics 
this assumption is false. 
User classifications. The other table lists the annual 
usage of each user and his percentage of annual use. Clearly, 
the Registrar uses the system more than any other user and 
uses nearly 42% of the total system's resources and over half 
of the accesses in July are made by the Registrar. 
This table suggests a possible division of users into 
five classes which are presented in Table 4-12. Recovery 
from a security breach could then be based on user class. 
All efforts would be made to resume services to Class A mem¬ 
bers with efforts filtering down as services are re-insti- 
tuted for a user class. 
A variation of this theme might be to establish class 
membership for each individual month. This would consider 
the user's peak usage period in determining membership class. 
Another variation might lump together classes to produce 
larger classes with bounds which are less precisely defined. 
This could create classes with large memberships which might 
then require that recovery resources would have to be spread 
too thin among class members. 
The assumption behind this approach is that the amount 
of computer usage is the key determinant of security needs. 
In some installations that assumption might be true but it 
cannot be taken on blind faith. 
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Table 4-12 
Suggested User Classes 
Class 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
Bounds Members 
25% to 100% Registrar 
10% to 24,99% Telephone 
Graduate School 
Bursar 
2% to 9.99% A.D.P. 
Financial Aid 
Housing 
1% to 1.99% Public Safety 
Stockbridge 
0% to 0.99% Provost 
Institutional Studies 
For example, comparing the Telephone Operation with the 
Graduate School would lead us to believe that loss of the 
computer would be more difficult for the Telephone Operation 
to bear than the Graduate School. The Telephone Operation 
is an inquiry operation only that can be without the system 
with few or no consequences. It is true that students 
would be unable to obtain telephone numbers that they want 
but that would cut back a service which has little economic 
impact on the University. 
The Graduate School uses the computer to update records 
as well as to make inquiries. When the system is down the 
updating becomes backed up which creates a work overload for 
its office staff. This situation is quite different from 
the Telephone Operation as records are not updated. 
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A fair compromise would be to evaluate the operational 
effect of a security breach on each class member. If the 
effect is greater than the average class member's, the user 
could be pushed up to the next higher class. Similarly, if the 
effect is less than the average class member's, the user 
could be pushed down to the next lower class. This should 
be done for each month to account for peak usage and the op¬ 
erational effect that month. 
It can be concluded from the system usage analysis that 
peak usage periods are easily discernible and that user de¬ 
partments which heavily utilize the computer system can be 
easily identified. One must be careful not to make deduc¬ 
tions from this data by reviewing it in isolation. Heavy 
system usage does not perfectly equate with a need for 
strong security because at least one user, the Telephone 
Operation, could go without the system and not be adversely 
affected. 
System usage analysis for peak periods was found to con¬ 
flict with the perceived peak usage periods as identified by 
user departments. Because of this inconsistency, one cannot 
draw any specific conclusions about peak periods until the 
reason for this inconsistency is discovered. 
It can be concluded that information obtained from this 
analysis is necessary but not sufficient for determining 
security needs. This method of analyzing security needs must 
be supplemented by other methods. 
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The Four Methods Reviewed 
Security needs are different in a data base environment 
than in the traditional setting. This situation results from 
the condition that an action by one user could adversely 
affect a great number of users or all users. 
Four alternatives for estimating security needs have 
been suggested. These alternatives were reviewed in a uni¬ 
versity setting to determine their validity in measuring se¬ 
curity needs. It was found that none of these alternatives 
shed much light on user security requirements in this par¬ 
ticular situation. 
Collecting various pieces of data to define security 
needs is not a complete ansvzer to this problem. It is, hov;- 
ever, effective in the establishment of authority matrices 
and for an understanding of system usage patterns. 
From the user interviews one might conclude that secur¬ 
ity is an unimportant issue. With respect to student records 
and minor problems that can occur, this may be true. Surely 
the on-line system at the University is not as critical as a 
similar system in operation at BankAmericard. Gross problems are 
the ones that users are unwilling to consider the possibility 
of occurring. These are the events that have not as yet oc¬ 
curred but, if they ever do, will cause great operational 
problems to the University. 
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A fifth method proposed. Another method that might be 
suggested would be to keep a log of the occurrence of secur¬ 
ity breaches. This log could then be used to estimate the 
probability of an event or a class of events occurring. In 
fact, a number of security breaches have already occurred on 
the University of Massachusetts campus with only a couple of 
them directly related to student records. Because they are 
indicative of possible future security breaches in student 
records some examples are presented below: 
1. During the Spring of 1975 master keys were found to be 
missing for over 2100 offices on campus. The missing 
keys allow access to the University Research Computing 
Center as well as most of the research laboratories on 
campus. 
2. A fire in Tobin Hall destroyed scientific experiments 
that had been in progress for m.any years. In addition 
to losing irreplaceable research data, a minicomputer, 
valued at over $10,000, was destroyed. 
3. Many years ago, a female student employee in the Regis¬ 
trar’s Office was discovered altering records of another 
student. The employee had been dating the other stu¬ 
dent, a football player. She was attempting to alter 
his records to maintain his football eligibility. 
4. During the Spring of 1975, many mischievous students 
were able to determine sign-on codes for students using 
the University Research Computing Center by finding 
these numbers on discarded printouts. Because each 
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user was able to assign his own passwords, but seldom 
did, and because sign-on codes ran sequentially for a 
block of numbers, these students were able to sign-on 
and randomly create passwords for that number and 
other numbers that followed in sequence. When the 
owner of the number next attempted to sign-on, he was 
denied access by the system because he did not know 
the password. 
5. In the Fall of 1974, the scheduling run was stopped as a re¬ 
sult of a machine error. When it was restarted, inade¬ 
quate restart procedures resulted in a large propor¬ 
tion of students being given empty schedules. Owing to 
the lateness resulting from the re-run, a decision was 
made to issue the schedules which later resulted in 
havoc at the Scheduling Office. 
6. In two unrelated cases terminals were installed in 
user departments with incorrect accessing capabilities. 
In one case, the user was not given sufficient acces¬ 
sing authority which resulted in ADP being immediately 
informed and the situation corrected. 
The reverse occurred in the other case. The user 
was granted excessive accessing powers that were not 
uncovered until a representative of the Provost's 
Office was passing through the user's office and 
noticed employees accessing information beyond their 
"need to know." His discovery led to a quick reversal 
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of the situation. 
7. During the Fall of 1973, a new parking system was be¬ 
ing installed on campus. The new system called for 
greatly increased parking fees which were being op¬ 
posed by the University employees' union and the stu¬ 
dent body. 
Management Systems was responsible for program¬ 
ming the billing system as well as the space alloca¬ 
tion system. A full-time programmer who was assigned 
to the project went on an extended vacation owing to 
suspected union pressure. To complete the project, a 
graduate student was employed. 
Near the completion date of the project, the 
graduate student stopped coming to work and was fired. 
It was then discovered that the nearly completed sys¬ 
tem was "booby trapped" to prevent it from working 
properly. Only a crash programming effort prevented 
the parking system from being completely sabotaged. 
8. On niunerous occasions the administration building 
has been taken over by student groups. In no case 
have computer operations been interrupted by these 
disruptions except for preventing key personnel from 
entering the building. 
Because these events have already occurred, security 
cannot be ignored. Many of the users' less obvious security 
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needs could be satisfied if many of the gross problems that 
can cause catastrophes could be prevented. 
By maintaining a log of the events which have created 
security problems on campus, we may come closer to defining 
users* security needs than any of the other four methods sug¬ 
gested by determining gross problems and developing counter¬ 
measures for them. It is clear from this study that user 
departments are not willing to consider security problems. 
Perhaps this fifth method will demonstrate to those users 
that security is, in fact, an important issue worthy of con¬ 
sideration. 
Factors of a university security plan. Although the 
study failed to expose clear procedures for defining security 
needs, six important factors of an adequate data base secur¬ 
ity plan in a university setting have become apparent. These 
are: 
1. User departments must be aware of possible security 
breaches, the effect of those breaches on their de¬ 
partments, and their roles in preventing the breaches 
from occurring. 
2. A clear definition must exist of the control of 
data elements within the data base. 
3. Adequate physical security measures must be es¬ 
tablished to prevent illegal access to the computer 
center and to prevent destruction from Acts of God. 
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4. Usage of key data elements must be monitored to 
prevent accidental or intentional destruction, 
modification, or disclosure. 
5. Adequate restart and recovery procedures must be 
established to prevent the modification of the 
data base in the event of machine failure. 
6. Key data elements, up-to-date programs, and 
documentation for those programs must be backed 
up in an offsite location. 
These factors can be thought of as minimum considerations. 
However, their implementation will eliminate many of the gross 
security breaches that might occur in a typical university 
setting and will, therefore, satisfy many of the users' needs. 
In the next chapter we will review what has been sug¬ 
gested by this study and review its basic limitations. 
Finally, we shall make recommendations for future study. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
It was the purpose of this study to review various 
methods for defining security needs in a data base environ¬ 
ment. The selection of this topic was based on the assump¬ 
tion that security needs vary based on the user's applica¬ 
tion of the computer system. However, little is known about 
these needs so that security plans are developed without 
much consideration given to the value of the plan versus the 
value of what it should be protecting. If needs can be de¬ 
fined then a security plan can be developed which minim.izes 
costs and maximizes protection. 
Security is a complex issue. Users are not able to say 
that conditions in their departments require that locks be 
put on the computer room doors, or that files be backed up, 
or that access restrictions be imposed. Staff in Management 
Systems and Administrative Data Processing are unable to do 
this as well. It is difficult to define need in relation to 
various countermeasures. 
Defining needs in relation to various threats is more 
easily accomplished. For example, it is much easier to de¬ 
termine the outcxare on a user department of a fire that puts 
the computer out of business than to determine the value of 
the fire detection equipment to each department. 
It was thought, then, that security needs would be best 
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estimated when viewed from the effect that they would have 
on the user departments. It was also believed that this 
would be the easiest to estimate by the various user depart¬ 
ments , 
Summary 
At the beginning of the study it was noted that the in¬ 
tention of this paper was to be an exploratory field study 
in a university setting. The first chapter presented a 
quick overview of the problem with defining security needs 
and described how we were going to pursue it. 
In the second chapter a general discussion was pre¬ 
sented of various work that has been done in computer secur¬ 
ity. This material was presented to give the reader an in¬ 
troduction to the subject of computer security and explain 
a number of terms that are unique to the field. While the 
material is not complete, it does present an overview of the 
relevant material that has been written about the subject 
matter. Each important part of a security plan was pre¬ 
sented and described in some detail. 
The premise underlying the third chapter is that se¬ 
curity needs are the foundation of any security plan. This 
chapter contained several sections: (1) Without a clear 
understanding of needs, an adequate security plan is impos¬ 
sible to construct. Likewise, it is important that the 
structure of security plans be clearly understood if this 
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foundation is to be the proper one. So, because we con¬ 
sidered security needs in a data base environment, the 
structure of data bases must be understood. Thus, we dis¬ 
cussed data organization, key data characteristics, and 
the problems of data base design. (2) Further, the third 
chapter described how data is stored in a problem solving 
environment rather than in a user oriented environment. 
Data elements are stored once which, although saving stor¬ 
age space and updating time, creates an interdependence 
among users not traditionally found. Increased management 
flexibility is gained at the loss of data independence. 
(3) And, in addition, design criteria for a security plan 
were presented. It was pointed out that the relationships 
between these variables have not been adequately explored. 
(4) Finally, it was suggested that as more funds are com¬ 
mitted to a security plan, the probability of detection 
will increase. While no hard evidence supports this con¬ 
clusion, it was made on the assumption that an intruder 
would be less likely to attempt to breach the system should 
he feel that his probability of being uncovered is in¬ 
creased. As he notices more efforts going into the secur¬ 
ity plan then he perceives that his chances of getting 
caught will increase. The inverse of this relationship was 
also suggested. 
All of these variables and their entwining relation¬ 
ships make up a functional security plan. However, these 
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relationships are not understood today. 
In the fourth chapter, four initial and alternative 
methods of determining security needs in a university 
setting were suggested. That setting, as well as a control 
problem in that setting, were discussed. 
It was recommended that the data base administrator be 
the controller of the entire data base and would act as an 
agent of the Users' Advisory Committee. This is considered 
to be a necessary security requirement to maintain the in¬ 
tegrity of the data base by preventing a proliferation of 
various security procedures from all of the user departments. 
1. As the first method of defining security needs, it 
was suggested that users be interviewed. These interviews 
proved less than satisfactory in providing a definitive list 
of security needs, but they did provide valuable insights 
into the operation of the user departments. 
Users, in general, were unable to estimate the effect 
of losing, modifying, or disclosing individual records or 
the entire data file. However, they were able to provide 
estimates of the effect on their departments should the com¬ 
puter be "down" for any length of time, but even then their 
estimates of peak usage periods were inconsistent with other 
findings to be presented later. It is apparent that they 
have not given ample consideration to security problems. 
Written operational procedures for the use of the com¬ 
puter system and the distribution of computer resident in- 
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formation inmost users' departments is non-existent. Dis¬ 
aster plans, as well, are non-existent. 
User support is required to insure that security risks 
are minimized and that recovery, should it be necessary, is 
rapid. Based on the interviews conducted, this support 
and interest were not found to exist. 
2. A second method proposed was to define a complete 
list of data elements and to identify those users that have 
the ability to create, update, and/or access these data ele¬ 
ments. It was found that this procedure offers information 
about how the data base will be constructed and how it will 
be used. It also provides for the establishment of author¬ 
ity matrices which is this method's greatest value. In 
addition, it might be possible to determine how to physical¬ 
ly construct the data base dependent on a commonalty of uses 
of data elements. 
3. Segmenting data elements according to frequency of 
use was a third method. From this method we were able to 
determine which data elements are most frequently used. It 
was also possible to determine which data elements were used 
by many of the user departments. 
This method identified the data elements which must be 
more frequently backed up and monitored for illegal access 
attempts. As the data base will be quite large, all data 
elements will not be backed up or monitored and a procedure 
for establishing a priority is necessary. 
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4. The fourth method reviewed was that of system usage. 
By reviewing the manner in which the system is utilized we 
were able to identify actual peak usage periods. The util¬ 
ization pattern that evolved could be used as an aid in de¬ 
veloping an adequate security plan. 
It is important that utilization information not be used 
in a vacuum. Other information, such as that obtained in 
user interviews, will verify or refute the conclusions drawn 
-from utilization studies. In fact, inconsistencies between 
the user interviews and the utilization studies were found to 
be significant. From this study it is clear that a security 
plan must be developed around the Registrar's system usage. 
A fifth method was suggested after it was concluded 
that the other four methods were of marginal value in de¬ 
fining security needs. It was suggested that a log be main¬ 
tained of security breaches to generate occurrence probabil¬ 
ities for these events and to dramatize to the user depart¬ 
ments that security breaches can occur. 
A general conclusion that might be drawn from this pro¬ 
ject is that the four original methods suggested might have 
little value in defining security needs in any university 
setting. As the data elements were developed froni the WICHE 
report and are, therefore, standard in many universities, it 
is fair to assume that the conclusions suggested here could 
apply to other universities as well. 
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A glimmer of hope exists in the fifth method proposed. 
It might be possible to log security breaches for a large 
number of universities. Statistical analysis of these cases 
could then be used to determine university security needs 
based on statistics gathered from actual cases. 
Limitations of The Study 
The very nature of an exploratory study makes it quite 
limited. It was the purpose of this study to look at secur¬ 
ity needs in a university data base environment and to re¬ 
view alternatives about defining those needs. Conclusions 
based on statistical tests are impossible and impractical 
until more is learned about how to determine these needs. 
Therefore, results are based on insights suggested rather 
than conclusions that have been proven. 
As the test site was a university, it might be danger¬ 
ous to generalize to a commercial environment. Neverthe¬ 
less, many of the insights uncovered here might be applic¬ 
able to those settings. 
Security is highly individualized. Each computer in¬ 
stallation has a different set of needs that must be de¬ 
termined to develop its own security plan. While a limita¬ 
tion might be that little of what we have learned is trans¬ 
ferable, that is a limitation of security plans rather than 
of this particular study. 
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The logging of security breaches in only one case pro¬ 
vides little information to generalize from. If logs of 
security breaches could be compiled for a large number of 
academic institutions, then the results could be used to es¬ 
tablish occurrence probabilities. From these logs we might 
have been able to establish the two or three most serious 
security problems. 
Finally, security issues are by their very nature pri¬ 
vate which results in people being unwilling to openly dis¬ 
cuss their problems. Therefore, a complete set of security 
breaches which directly relate to individual security needs 
is never possible to obtain. This is compounded by the fact 
that security is dynamic which simply means that new ways to 
covertly obtain information from a computer system are al¬ 
ways being discovered. 
In spite of these limitations, this exploratory study 
has uncovered some valuable insights into the security needs 
problem. Some of these insights include that users can be 
classified according to use of the system or their expected 
harm should the system be down, the data base can be seg-mented 
by its most vulnerable data elements, and users' perceptions 
of peak usage periods are not always accurate. Defining se¬ 
curity needs will never be an exact science but, perhaps, 
some inroads have been made in looking at the important issues. 
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Areas for Further Research 
It is not difficult to define areas of computer secur¬ 
ity that are open to further research. Computer security is 
a new area of concern that remains more of an art than a 
science. The range of research topics will continue to grow 
as new computer systems are developed and new computer uses 
defined. However, the areas mentioned here will only relate 
to those topics uncovered while working on this study. 
First, the relationships between effectiveness, economy, 
simplicity, and reliability must be further explored. As 
these relationships become clearer, we will move one step 
closer to being able to develop cost effective plans. 
Second, establishing procedures for defining objective 
functions of security plans will also extend a user's ability 
to create his own cost effective plan. Various objective 
functions might be suggested and security plans developed to 
meet those objective functions. It might then be possible 
to generalize objective functions to various computer environ¬ 
ments . 
Third, would be a review of the functioning of a com¬ 
puter system to determine if the system utilization pattern 
suggests a security plan that dynamically changes based on 
the changing system usage patterns. Research such as this 
might be very difficult to accomplish but its value to the 
protection of computer systems could be beneficial. 
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Fourth, much research is still required to define in¬ 
dividual security needs. The variables that enter into this 
determination are not clearly defined. They must be identi¬ 
fied for differing user environments. 
Finally, of the material published about security, much 
of it is too general for direct application to unique situa¬ 
tions. In cases where individuals have taken a unique ap¬ 
proach to solving their security problems, they have been 
unwilling to publish the procedures that they went through. 
While this is quite understandable, more has to be published 
so that all computer users might benefit from their experi¬ 
ences. The future of computer security research lies in 
the willingness of all to share their knowledge and experi¬ 
ences. 
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APPENDIX A 
Registrar 
Interviewees - Ralph Jones 
Douglas Sutherland 
Marion Markwell 
Function - Acts as the central record-keeping agency of 
the university for student records. 
Information Needs 
Have extensive power to update and access 
student records. Can create new records for 
students which were not created in the ad¬ 
missions office. Also, creates grade records. 
Has the most extensive information needs of 
any user of the data base 
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Graduate Registrar 
Interviewee Robert Swasey 
Functions - Acts both as an admissions officer and regis¬ 
trar for the graduate school. Responsible 
for all graduate records from, application 
for admission until graduation or other term¬ 
ination. 
Information Needs - 
Information needs parallel those of the under¬ 
graduate admissions office and the undergradu¬ 
ate registrar. Have the power to create, up¬ 
date, and access all graduate records. 
Bursar 
Interviewee Robert Mishol 
Function - Bills both undergraduate and graduate students 
for services of the university. Collects and 
records payments. 
Information Needs - 
Requires access to all student records rele¬ 
vant to the billing function. Can create and 
update elements related to bill payment. In¬ 
formation needs increase at various times of 
the year. 
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Admissions 
Interviewee 
Function 
Information 
Housing 
Interviewee 
Function 
Information 
Robert Doolan 
Reviews applications for admissions and read¬ 
mission to the university and acts accordingly. 
Needs - 
Student "stats" records are created by Admis¬ 
sions from the application and Princeton 
scores which becomes the principal data base 
record when the student is accepted at the 
university. While they are the principal 
creator of the data record they have no power 
to create or update items on the "stats" 
record once it is turned over to the registrar. 
J. Bruce Cochrane 
Assign students to dormitories on campus. 
Make changes to student's current address. 
Control funding for bond payments. 
Needs - 
Access address information and other relevant 
information such as birth-date, marital sta¬ 
tus, and veteran status. Can up-date address 
information and creates new address data ele¬ 
ments. Will have increased information needs 
in conjunction with the increased responsi¬ 
bilities of the Office of Residental Life. 
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Financial Aid 
Interviewee - Richard Dent 
Function To grant financial aid to deserving students 
and to control work-study programs on campus. 
Information Needs - 
Requires the use of the student data base to 
access records in the performance of their 
duties. Cannot create or update any records 
in the student data base. 
Scheduling 
Interviewee - Thomas Chamberlain 
Function - Prepare and maintain the schedule of all 
courses being given at the university. 
Information Needs - 
Has no access to the student data base. All 
work is done on their own data which is then 
provided to the registrar for registration 
purposes. 
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Institutional Studies 
Interviewee - George Beatty 
Function - To satisfy the needs of the university for 
statistical reports about the operation of 
the university. 
Information Needs - 
Has complete access to all student informa¬ 
tion for the purpose of completing their 
studies. Does not have the power to update 
or create records but can create certain 
statistical records as an intermediate step 
in the completion of their work. 
Administrative Data Processing 
Interviewee - Raymond Bombard 
Malcolm Fiske 
Function - To supply computer related services to all 
user groups in the university. 
Information Needs - 
Based on their function, they have access to 
all student records but do not have the 
authority to create or update records except 
when acting as an agent of a user. 
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Telephone 
Function - To act as student telephone information 
service. 
Information Needs - 
Access to the student data base to obtain 
student name, student number, current phone 
number, and permanent phone number. Have no 
pov7er to create or update information. 
Public Safety 
Function - Law enforcement of the university. Responsi¬ 
ble for protecting the property of the uni¬ 
versity, its student body, and employees from 
illegal attack and the student body and em¬ 
ployees from personal harm. Authorized to 
make arrests and investigations leading to 
arrest. 
Information Needs - 
Has access to various data elements in the 
student data base including student name, 
number, address and parent's name and address. 
No access to student grades or financial 
records. 
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I. BASIC CIASSIFICATICN ArrD 
ii)E.';tificaticn data 
-- 
1, student Dumber X X X 
2 Social Security Number X X X 
3 Student Name X X X 
4 Level X X X 
1- 
5 Class X X X 
6 Half Year and Exoiration X 
7 Sex X X X 
8 Maritial Status X X X 
9 Date of Birth X X X 
10 Veteran X X X 
11 Citizenship/Visa X X X 
12 CCEHS X X 
1 Belipcious Preference X X 
14 Ethnic-oriprin X X X 
15 Major Department Title X X X 
16 Major Derartmtne Number X X X 
17 Fraternity/Sorority X 
: ■ ■ '1 :: _] 
II, PAREN'T/GUAHDIAN AN’D FEHKANENT 
NAME AND ADDRESS DATA _ 
k 
1 1 
L._J 
18 Name of Parent/Guardian X X X 
— 
19 Address of Farent/Guardian X X X 
20 Permanent Address X X X 
21 Foreign Country X X X 
22 Homs Telemhor.c X X X 
23 Zip Code X X X ) 
1 
1 
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III. ENROLLMENT AND WITHDRAWAL DATA i 
24 Entry Date 
X X X 
25 Entrance Status 
X X X 
-1 
1 
26 Entrance Semester 
X X X 
-1 
2? Latest Admissions Node 
X X X 
28 Latest Entrance Semester 
X X X 
> 
1 
29 Initial Admissions Node 
X X X 
30 Initial Entrance Semester 
X X X 
31 Initial Entrance Class 
X X X 
32 Withdrawal Date 
X X 
33 V/ithdrav;al Reason 
X X 
34 Semesters Complete 
35 Summ.er Withdrawal Date 
X X 
36 Previous Withdrawal Date 
37 Previous Withdrawal Reason 
38 Previous I'ur.ber Semesters 
Completed 
39 Initial Withdrav/al Date 
X X 
40 Initial Withdrawal Reason 
X X 
4l Initial Number Semesters 
Comnleted X X 
42 Future V/ithdrav/al Reason 
43 Future Number Semesters 
, Comnleted 
44 Date Withdrawal Notice 
46 Withdrawal Effective 
47 V/ithdrav.’al Processed X 
48 Summer Session Codes X 
1 
1 
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IV. LOCAL (ON CAKPUS) RESIDENCE 
INFORNATI CM—CURRENT 
49 School Address X 
50 School Telephone X 
51 Residence Area X 
52 Residence Hall Space Code X 
53 Residence Hall Euildinec Project 
Code X 
54 No Address Fla^ 
X 
55 On Exchane:e Flas: 
X 
56 Exchanf^e Proo:ram X 
V. LOCAL (ON CAKPUS) RESIDENCE 
INFORKATIC::—FUTURE 
— 
57 School Address X 
58 School Telephone X 
59 Residence Area X 
60 Residence Hall Space Code X 
61 Residence Hall Building: Project 
Code 
X 
62 No Address Flap; 
X 
63 On Exchan2:e Flaa: 
X 
64 Not Returninp: Fla?r X 
VI. MISCELLANEOUS BILLING DATA -—i I 
65 Billiniy Residence Category X 
66 Latest Semester Billed X 
67 Fee Paid/Cleared Code X 
68 Alternate Address Code X 
69 Camrus Residence Regulations 
Execution Flas: 
X 
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70 Board Regulation Exemption 
X 
71 Coed Permission Code 
X 
- 
72 Room Deposit Paid Flat' X 
73 Amount of Room Deposit X 
74 Graduate Billlns: Block X 
- 
75 Clearance Cards Made Flae: X 
76 Board Paid/Cleared X 
VII. ACADEMIC DATA — 1-- 
77 Credit/Point Data X X 
78 Deerree Credits X X 
79 Required Degree Subjects Rec¬ 
ord X X 
80 L-ast Semester Completed 
X X 
81 Semester Status Flas: 
82 Probation Counter 
83 Suspensions 
84 Graduation Diploma Name 
X X 
85 Expected Deprree X X . 
86 Expected Degree Date X X 
87 Registrar's Degree Clearance 
Flag X X 
68 Department/School Degree 
Clearance ?la=" X X 
89 No Honors Flag 
X X 
90 Number Credits Passed 
91 Number Credits Graded 
92 Number Fass/Fail Core 
) 
1 
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93 Number Credits Pass/Fail 
94 Number Semesters Completed 
I 
1 
1 
95 Pre-Hef^istration Flag i 
96 Schedule Chance Flag 
VIII. ADKISSIOMS DATA 
97 Admissions Update Code X X 
98 Last Institution Code X X 
99 A.dmisDions Data X 
100 Graduate Admissions Data X 
101 Summer Counseling Session X 
IX. KISCELLAUEOUS PHOCESSIb^C- DATA 
102 Teleprocessing Flags 
103 Comment Lines X X 
104 TP Change Printed Flag 
105 National Defence Code X X 
106 Health Form on File Flag X X 
107 Delete Flag X X X 
108 Print Flag 1 
X. PEES 
" -r 
L 
109 Tution X 
110 Graduate Tax X 
111 Undergraduate Tax X 
1 
112 Health Fee X 1 \ 
113 Medical Insurance X 1 
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114 Identification Card X 
Board X 
116 Rent X 
117 Telephone X 
118 Campus Center X 
119 Fine Arts X 
120 Proerram Fee X 
121 WKKASS PIRG X 
122 late Ref^istration X 
123 Graduation Pee X i 
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I. BASIC CTASSIFICATION 
IDENTIFICATION DATA 
1. Student Number 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 Social Security Number 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
3 Student Name 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 Level 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 Class 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 fl 1 
6 Half Year and Exolration 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
V Sex 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
8 Karitial Status 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 X 
— 
9 Date of Firth 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
10 Veteran 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
11 Citizenship/Visa 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
12 CCEBS 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
13 Reliprious Preference 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 X 
14 Ethnic-oriiyin 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
15 Major Department Title 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
l6 Major Deoartmtne Number 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
17 Fratemity/Sorority 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
11. PAHENT/GUARDIAN AND F:-:RKA!:ENT 
NAME AND ADDRESS DATA 
.1 1- 
18 Name of Parent/Guardian 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
19 Address of Parent/Guardian 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
20 Permanent Address 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
21 Foreirn Country 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
22 Hone Tele’^hone L 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
23 2ip Code 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 I 
1 1 
185 
«} 
u 
to 
T-i 
bC 
0 
K A
d
m
is
si
o
n
s 
G
ra
d
u
a
te
 
S
c
h
o
o
l 
1 
B
u
rs
a
r 
H
o
u
si
n
s:
 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
A
id
 
T
e
le
o
h
o
n
e
 
P
ro
v
o
st
 
P
u
b
li
c
 
S
a
fe
ty
 
In
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
a
l 
S
tu
d
ie
s 
III. ENHCLLI'ENT AI.'D WITHDRAWAL DATA 1 
2U Entry Date 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
25 Entrance Status 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
26 Entrance Semester 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
27 Latest Admissions Kode 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
28 Latest Entrance Semester 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
29 Initial Admissions Kode 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
30 Initial Entrance Semester 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 Q 1 
31 Initial Entrance Class 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
32 Withdrawal Date 1 1 1 1 1 1 Q Q _j_! 
33 V/ithdrav/al Reason 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
3^ Semesters Complete 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
35 Summer V/ithdrav.’al Date 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
i 
1 i 
36 Previous V/ithdrawal Date 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 ! 
37 Previous Withdrav/al Reason 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
38 Previous I'urher Semesters 
Completed 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 
1 ! 
39 Initial V/ithdrawal Date 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
UO Initial Withdrawal Reason 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
4l Initial I'umber Ser.esters 
Comoleted 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
k2 Future Withdrav;al Reason 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
43 Future Fumber Semesters 
Comnleted 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
44 Date Withdrawal /.’otlce 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
46 Withdrawal Effective 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
47 Withdrawal Processed 1 1 1 1 1 \ Q 0 0 J 
48 Summer Session Cedes 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
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1 
IV. LOCAL (Oil CAKPUS) HESIDEMCE 
I NFCRr’ATICM—CURRENT 
49 School Address 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
50 School Telephone 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
51 Residence Area 1 0 1 1 1 1 C 0 0 1 
52 Residence Hall Space Code 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
53 Residence Hall Euildinp; Project 
Code 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
* 54 Ko Address Fla?: 
1 0 1 1 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
55 On Exchansre Flas: 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
56 Exchanpre Proo:ran 
1 0 0 1 1 1 Q fi -IL, . 1 
V. LOCAL (CU CAKPUS) RESIDENCE 
IKFOHKATIC::—FUTURE 
•— 1 r- 
57 School Address 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
- 
58 School Telephone 1 O' 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
59 Residence Area 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
60 Residence Hall Space Code 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
61 Residence Hall Building?: Project 
Code 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
- 
62 No Address Flap: 
1 0 1 1 i \ 0 0 0 1 
63 On Exchansie Flae: 
1 p 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
64 Not Heturninp: Flapr 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
VI. laSCELLAKECUS BILLIKG DATA 1 
f—1—, 
65 Billing: Residence Catep^ory 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
66 Latest Semester Billed 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
67 Fee Paid/Cleared Code 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
68 Alternate Address Code 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
69 Cancus Residence Resrulatlons 
Exceotion Fla?: 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 c 
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70 Board Regulation Exemption 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
71 Coed Permission Code 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
- 
72 Room Deposit Paid Flat^ 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
73 Amount of Room Deposit 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
74 Graduate BillinR: Block 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
75 Clearance Cards Made Flac: 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
76 Board Paid/Cleared 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
VII. ACADEi:iC DATA —  
— 
1. 
77 Credit/Point Data 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
- 
78 Decree Credits 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
79 Required Decree Subjects Rec¬ 
ord 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
80 Last Semester Completed 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
81 Semester Status Flac 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
82 Probation Counter 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
83 Suspensions 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
84 Graduation Diploma Name 
1 C 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
85 Expected Decree 1 0 1. 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
86 Expected Decree Date 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
87 Recistrar's Der^ree Clearance 
Flac 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
88 Department/Schcol Decree 
Clearance Fla-^ 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
89 No Honors Flac 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
90 Number Credits Passed 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
91 Number Credits Graded 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
92 Number Fass/?all Core 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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93 Number Credits Pass/Fail 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
94 Number Semesters Completed 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
95 Pre-Re£^istration Flag 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
96 Schedule Change Flag 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
VIII. ADKISSIONS DATA — 
97 Admissions Update Code 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
98 Last Institution Code 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
99 Admissions Data 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
100 Graduate Admissions Data 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 ; 
101 Summer Counseling Session 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
L 
1 
' ■ '"1 
IX. MISCELLANEOUS PROCESSING DATA 
\.1 -1 
-1 
102 Teleprocessing Flags 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
103 Comment Lines 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
104 TP Change Printed Flag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
105 National Defence Code 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
106 Health Form on File Flag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
107 Delete Flag 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
108 Print Flag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
X. FEES i 
109 Tution 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
lip Graduate Tax 0 0 1 !• 0 0 0 0 0 1 
111 Undergraduate Tax 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
112 Health Fee 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
113 Medical Insurance 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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114 Identification Card 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
115 Board 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
116 Rent 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
117 Telephone 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
118 Campus Center 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
119 Fine Arts 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
- 
120 Procrram Fee 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
121 WKMASS PIRG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
122 Late Re/^istration 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
123 Graduation Fee 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 
1 L 
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I. 15ASIC Cl AS'JiriCATTON AND 
IDRNTIKICATICN DATA 
■ .. 
1. Stuf.lcrit I/umV)rtr 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 SooJnl Security N’urnbor 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 Student Neme 1 1 1 P 0 P p P p 0 
4 Level 
; 1 1 P 0 P n ft 0 0 
5 Clnnn 
JL^ 1 1 Q p P 0 ft ft n 
6 Nftlf yenr end Kxnlrntlon 9 P 1 Q 0 P ft ft ft n — 
7 Sox 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 Knrltlftl Statue 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Date of Hlrtb 1 1 1 0 p p p ft ft 0 
10 Votcron 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 p 
11 Cl t i zennh lp/71 fjn 1 1 1 0 p p p a 0 0 
12 CCE8S i 1 1 0 0 0 ft 1 ft r) --- 
13 HcllPrloun rreferenoe 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 ) 0 0 
14 Kthnlc-oriffln 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 -p -Q - P^ 
15 Major Dcpnrtnent Title 1 1 1 p 0 p p 0 .Q_ 
0 
„Q__ 
0 16 Major Dcnnrtmtno J.'un’ber 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
17 Frntemlty/Sororlty 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
II. rAHKI.'T/OUA-iDIAi: AND FMilMANI-NT 
NAME A?:D AXHhSS DATA 
18 Kamo of rarcnt/Guarcl Ian 1 1 p p p P p p p 
19 Addresn of rnrent/CuArdInn 1 1 p p p p 0 -JL ft 
20 T'eroinnent Adclronn 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 P 
21 Korclrn Country 1 1 1 p p p p p P P 
22 Hone Tftle^’ione 
1 
1 1 p p p p p P 0 
23 Zip Code 1 1 0 n n ft ft M n - 1 
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III. ENROILr.KKT AND WITHDRAV/AL DATA 
?M Entry Date 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Entrance Status 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 Entrance Semester 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 Latest Admlocicns Node 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 Latest Entrance Seneetcr 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 Initial Admisclons Node 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 Initial Entrance Semester ; 1 \ Q 0 9 9 9 9 9 
31 Initial Entrance Class 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 V/ithdrawal Date 1 0 1 0 0 0 9 ._(L. 
0 
..0.. 
33 V/ithdrav/al Reason 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 Semesters Complete 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 Summer V/lthdrav/al Date i 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 Previous V/ithdrawal Date 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 
37 Previous Withdrav/al Reason 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
38 Previous f'urher Semesters 
Completed 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 Initial V/ithdrawal Date 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UO Initial V/lthdrawal Reason 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
41 Initial Number Semesters 
Completed 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42 Future V/lthdrowalrteason 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
43 Future Number Semesters 
. Comnleted 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
44 Date Withdrawal Notice 
1 0 1 0 Q 0 Cl 0 9 , -XL_ 
0 46 V/lthdrawal Effective 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47 V/lthdrawal Processed 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48 Summer Session Codes 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
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IV. LOCAL (ON CAKPUS) RESIDENCE 
INFORNATICM—CURRENT 
49 School Address 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
50 School Telephone 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
51 Residence Area 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
52 Residence Kail Space Code 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
53 Residence Hall Euildina: Project 
Code 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
54 Ko Address Flae: 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
55 On Exchans:e Flas: 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
56 Exchange Pro°:ran 1 0 0 0 1 (? 0 Q 0 0 
V. LOCAL (ON CAKPUS) RESIDENCE 
INFORNATICN—FUTURE 
57 School Address 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 ft 
58 School Telephone 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
59 Residence Area 1 O' 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
60 Residence Hall Space Code 1 0 0 0 L 0 0 0 0 0 
61 Residence Hall Euildine: Project 
Code 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 ft ft 0 - 
62 Ko Address Flas: 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 ft ft 0 1 
63 On Exchansie Flaer 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ft 0 
64 Not Retuminp: Flac: 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
liti -V 
CL, 
VI. KISCELLANEOUS BIILIKG DATA • T 
65 BillinPT Residence Cateprory 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66 Latest Semester Billed 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
- 
67 Fee Paid/Cleared Code 0 0 0 ; 0 0 0 0 0 ft 
68 Alternate Address Code 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 JCL-- 
69 Canrus Residence Regulations 
Exception Flaq: 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 JL--. 
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70 Board ReE:ulatlon Exemption 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
71 Coed Permission Code 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
- 
72 Room Deposit Paid Flac; 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
73 Amount of Room Deposit 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
74 Graduate Billinp: Block 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
75 Clearance Cards Pade Flap: 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
76 Board Paid/Cleared 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
■ " ' 
0 
- - 
0 
VII. ACADEKIC DATA 
— 
— 
— 
— 
77 Credit/Point Data 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
- 
78 Decree Credits 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
79 Required Desrree Subjects Rec¬ 
ord 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
80 Last Semester Completed 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
81 Semester Status Flap: 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
82 Probation Counter 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 
83 Suspensions 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
84 Graduation Diploma Name 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
85 Expected Depcree 
1 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
86 Expected Dee:ree Date 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
87 Registrar's Decree Clearance 
Flarr 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
68 Department/School Dejrree 
Clearance Fla^' 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
89 No Honors Flap: 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 
90 Number Credits Passed 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
91 Humber Credit-s Graded 
;1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
92 Number Pass/Fail Core 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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93 Kiiraber Credits Fass/Fail 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
94 Kuraber Ser.esters Conpleted 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
95 Pre-He^istration Plae; 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
96 Schedule Char*^e Flaej 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VIII. ADMISSICrS CATA 1 
97 Adr:isslons Update Code 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 j 
98 Last Institution Code 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 1 
99 Adnissicns Data 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ti 
100 Graduate Adnissicns Data 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
101 Sucner Coiinselina: Session 0 1 0 0 0 c 0 0 c 0 
IX. KISCELLA!:ZCU£ ??.CCESSIi;C- DATA 
■ 
i 
102 Teleprocessiri^ Plans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
103 Connent Lines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
104 TP Charge Printed Flan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
105 National Defence Code 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
106 Health Pom on File Plan 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
107 Delete Flan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
108 Print Flag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
X. FEES i 
109 Tution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 
110 Graduate Tax 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
111 Undernraduate Tax 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
112 Health Fee 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 
113 Kedical Insurance 0 0 «1 0 0 0 0 
i 
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- 
114 Identification Card 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
115 Board 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
116 Rent 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
117 Telephone 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
118 Campus Center 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Q Q Q 
119 Fine Arts 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
120 Program Fee 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
121 V/KKASS PIHG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
122 Late Registration 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
123 Graduation Fee 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
APPENDIX E 
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APPENDIX E 
DATA FREQUENCY DATA FREQUENCY 
ELEMENT OF USE ELEMENT OF USE 
1 115 55 25 
2 31 57 47 
3 93 58 13 
4 116 59 6 
5 91 60 4 
6 12 61 27 
7 50 62 6 
8 36 63 18 
9 35 64 8 
10 47 67 13 
11 29 68 8 
12 24 69 27 
13 27 70 7 
14 25 71 4 
15 54 72 17 
16 1 73 11 
17 9 75 15 
18 17 76 1 
19 60 77 78 
20 209 78 36 
21 16 79 197 
22 17 80 8 
24 19 82 4 
26 48 83 4 
32 84 85 25 
33 28 86 21 
34 11 87 13 
35 13 88 8 
37 8 89 6 
38 6 90 5 
39 15 91 6 
40 6 92 4 
41 5 93 5 
42 12 95 7 
43 7 98 13 
44 7 99 73 
45 8 100 34 
47 1 101 1 
48 1 102 5 
49 165 103 15 
50 26 105 4 
51 9 106 1 
52 5 108 10 
53 10 115 4 
54 6 116 37 
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120 11 
201 3 
202 189 
203 141 
204 41 
205 23 
206 17 
207 33 
208 6 
209 2 
210 1 
211 4 
212 7 
213 4 
999 20 
APPENDIX F 
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32 
77 
99 
19 
15 
7 
26 
10 
57 
204 
116 
8 
78 
9 
100 
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11 
33 
61 
69 
13 
50 
14 
85 
55 
12 
205 
86 
399 
24 
63 
18 
22 
72 
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APPENDIX F 
FREQUENCY DATA FREQUENCY 
OF USE ELEMENT OF USE 
209 21 16 
107 75 15 
189 103 15 
165 39 15 
141 87 13 
116 58 13 
115 35 13 
93 67 13 
91 98 13 
84 42 12 
78 6 12 
73 120 11 
60 34 11 
54 73 11 
50 53 10 
48 103 10 
47 51 9 
47 17 9 
41 68 8 
37 88 8 
36 45 8 
36 64 8 
35 37 8 
34 80 8 
33 43 7 
31 95 7 
29 44 7 
28 70 7 
27 212 7 
27 208 6 
27 54 6 
26 40 6 
25 62 6 
25 59 6 
25 89 6 
24 38 6 
23 91 6 
21 52 5 
20 41 5 
19 90 5 
18 93 5 
17 102 5 
17 115 4 
17 60 4 
17 211 4 
202 
105 4 
92 4 
82 4 
83 4 
71 4 
213 4 
201 3 
209 2 
76 1 
218 1 
106 1 
16 1 
101 1 
48 1 
47 1 
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